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CYBERSECURITY, IDENTITY THEFT, AND STANDING LAW:  A 
FRAMEWORK FOR DATA BREACHES USING SUBSTANTIAL RISK IN A 
POST-CLAPPER WORLD 
 
A man who is used to acting in one way never changes; he must come to 
ruin when the times, in changing, no longer are in harmony with his ways. 
~Niccolò Machiavelli, THE PRINCE 
 
JAMES C. CHOU* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
	
Large-scale cyberattacks1 involving the theft of personal and confidential 
records continue to make headlines as cybersecurity evolves into a national 
issue.2  In 2015 alone, there were over 2,000 cases of data breaches with 
known data loss across a range of institutions.3  Many data breaches, such as 
                                                
* Articles Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 66.  J.D. Candidate, 2018 
American University Washington College of Law; M.S., George Mason University, 2008; B.A., 
University of Virginia, 2005.  Articles Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 66.  
My sincere thanks to Professor Jennifer Daskal for her wisdom and guidance, and the National 
Security Law Brief staff for their meticulous efforts and assistance in refining this Article.  
Above all, a sincere thanks to my parents, Jaw and My Duc, and to Carrie Zheng for their 
unwavering support 
1 “A [cybersecurity] incident is a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security 
policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.” PAUL CICHONSKI ET AL., NAT’L 
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. 800-61, REVISION 2, 
(DRAFT), COMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT HANDLING GUIDE 6 (2012). An incident can lead to 
web-service disruption, malware infection, and sensitive-data exposure.  
2 See President Barack Obama, Statement on Cybersecurity Framework (Feb. 12, 2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/12/statement-president-
cybersecurity-framework (“America’s economic prosperity, national security, and our individual 
liberties depend on our commitment to securing cyberspace”); see generally EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE (2011). 
3 VERIZON, 2015 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 3 (2015) [hereinafter DBIR 2015].  
For a list of major breaches involving national security or sensitive information, see David 
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those involving the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and Ashley 
Madison, have implicated more than just financial or identify-theft concerns, 
they have also raised national security issues and exposed victims to potential 
blackmail.4   
As the cyber threat evolves, there is more data suggesting that data-
breach victims are at a heightened risk of becoming subsequent victims for 
identity theft and other related crimes.5  In 2012, the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics estimated that identity theft affected 16.6 million people and 
inflicted financial losses totaling $24.7 billion, which is $10 billion more than 
burglary, vehicle theft, and general theft combined.6  Furthermore, estimates 
for 2014 increased, with an estimated 17.6 million victims totaling near $15.4 
billion.7  More importantly, while forensic analysis of some data breaches 
suggest a zero-day or complex attack that is hard to prevent, many high-
profile breaches could have been prevented through simple controls and 
safeguards.8 
                                                
Inserra and Paul Rosenzweig, Continuing Federal Cyber Breaches Warn Against Cybersecurity 
Regulation, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Oct. 27, 2014), 
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/10/continuing-federal-cyber-breaches-warn-against-
cybersecurity-regulation. 
4 See infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text. 
5 See Susan Ladika, Study: Data Breaches Pose a Greater Risk, CREDITCARDS.COM (Jul. 23, 2014), 
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/data-breach-id-theft-risk-increase-study-
1282.php (noting that the chances of being victimized after data loss have increased from one-
in-nine in 2010 to one-in-three in 2014); see also Eva Velasquez, Study Shows Link Between Breaches 
and Fraud, IDT911 (Jun. 10, 2010), http://idt911.com/education/blog/study-shows-link-
between-breaches-and-fraud (noting the Identity Theft Resource Center’s findings that data 
breach victims experience an eightfold increase of “existing [credit] card fraud” risk). 
6 ERIKA HARRELL & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2012 6 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit12.pdf. 
7 ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS OF 
IDENTITY THEFT, 2014 6-7 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf. 
8 See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. A zero-day attack generally involves exploiting a 
vulnerability that a software developer (and the broader community) is not yet aware of. Kim 
Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Is A Zero-Day? WIRED (Nov. 11, 2014, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2014/11/what-is-a-zero-day/. Zero-day attacks are harder to defend 
against because there is no known patch or fix for the vulnerability. However, most data 
breaches involving consumer data are not in this category. See DBIR 2015, supra note 3, at 15 
(finding that most vulnerabilities were known at the time a breach occurred).  Plus, there are 
also established methods that corporations can use to “harden” their systems against zero-day 
attacks.  See generally LINGYU WANG ET AL., K-ZERO DAY SAFETY: A NETWORK SECURITY 
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Since Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,9 many courts have shut the 
door on victims alleging a heightened risk of injury, particularly when the 
injury is identity theft, because Clapper does not permit standing based on a 
heightened risk of injury alone.10  But recently, the Seventh Circuit disagreed 
with that view when deciding Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group,11 a case 
involving a breach of Neiman Marcus’ systems, holding that Clapper neither 
altered standing law nor did it foreclose all heightened risk injuries.12  This 
Article agrees and argues that Clapper did not alter the Article III standing 
requirements; it merely reemphasized the Court’s demand for a heightened 
scrutiny for constitutional challenges to government activity.  Consequently, 
the Seventh Circuit correctly applied standing law in Remijas under a 
“substantial” risk theory. 
Part I will discuss large-scale data breaches and its relationship with 
identity theft, Clapper, and Article III standing on imminent injuries.  Part II 
argues that the minimum constitutional threshold should allow standing 
under a heightened-risk-of-identity-theft (HRIT) using a “substantial” or 
“reasonable” risk threshold.  Part III applies Part II to data-breach cases, 
specifically, and suggests several factors the courts could consider when 
determining whether a victim faces a sufficiently imminent injury for Article 
III standing.  Part III also demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit used similar 
factors in Remijas.  I then conclude. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
METRIC FOR MEASURING THE SECURITY RISK OF NETWORKS AGAINST UNKNOWN ATTACKS 
10-13 (2013), http://csrc.nist.gov/staff/Singhal/ieee_tdsc_2013_final_version.pdf.  
9 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l U.S.A., 133 S. Ct. 1134 (2013). 
10 See Peters v. St. Joseph Servs.’ Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 856 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“Clapper has 
resolved the circuit split.”); Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 365 (M.D. Pa. 2015) 
(“Allegations of increased risk of identity theft are insufficient to allege a harm.”).  
11 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). 
12 Id. at 693-94. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
	
A. Data Breaches and Lawsuits 
	
The struggle for adequate cybersecurity continues as society further 
incorporates Internet and digital technology in all aspects of life.13  A critical 
cybersecurity tenant is protecting sensitive personally identifiable information 
(PII) and online accounts, which includes names, addresses, social-security 
numbers (SSNs), financial data, consumer habits, passwords, medical records, 
and other information that can be used to further fraud and identity theft.14  
PII is becoming an extremely valuable commodity for criminals, foreign 
intelligence operatives, and independent actors within the digital age, who 
often utilize PII to commit fraud or espionage.15  Massive black-markets have 
been established within the deep web to sell and purchase PII.16  More 
                                                
13 See KASEY LOGAUGH, DELOITTE, THE NEW DIGITAL DIVIDE 5 (2014), 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/consumer-business/us-rd-
thenewdigitaldivide-041814.pdf (noting that digital sales were estimated at $1.1 trillion in 2013 
and “projected to grow to $1.5 trillion by the end of 2014”).  
14 See GARY STONEBURNER, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
SPECIAL PUB. 800-33, UNDERLYING TECHNICAL MODELS FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
SECURITY, 2-5 (2001) (noting that “confidentiality,” “availability,” and “integrity” are the three 
main objectives for information security). “Confidentiality” is about securing “private” 
information from unauthorized access. Confidentiality is often prioritized “behind availability 
and integrity.” See also 44 U.S.C. § 3542(B)(1)(B) (2015) (defining confidentiality); see also ERICA 
in Federal information policy); ERIKA MCCALLISTER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF SCISTANDARDS & 
TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. 800-122, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE 
CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII), ES-1-2 (2010) 
(discussing various forms of PII). 
15 See Graham Messick and Maria Gavrilovic, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal 
Information (60 Minutes Mar. 9,2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-data-brokers-selling-your-personal-information/) (noting 
that a complete set of identity information for health-insurance fraud could fetch hundreds of 
dollars on the black market); see also Tim Greene, Anthem Hack: Personal Data Stolen Sells for 10X 
Price of Stolen Credit Card Numbers, NETWORK WORLD (Feb 6. 2015, 5:49 AM), 
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2880366/security0/anthem-hack-personal-data-stolen-
sells-for-10x-price-of-stolen-credit-card-numbers.html (noting that social security numbers, 
birth dates, and other personal information are more valuable than credit card accounts 
because they are reusable). 
16 See Namaan Huq, Follow the Data: Dissecting Data Breaches and Debunking Myths, TREND MICRO 
22-35 (2015), https://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-
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interestingly, some organizations have even legally monetized PII by 
developing digital platforms enabling consumers to, effectively, sell their 
personal information (in the form of habits, preferences, and interests) for 
compensation.17   
There were many interesting data-breach incidents in 2014-2015, 
particularly Ashley Madison, Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the 
healthcare sector, and retailers.  These cases represent the expanding creativity 
and motivational spectrum that cyber-criminals have, who are expanding the 
range of financial and nonfinancial damages victims sustained. 
In late 2015, a hacking group stole PII and user accounts from 
AshleyMadison.com18 with the intention of forcing the site to shut down.19  
After “completely compromising the company’s user databases,” the attackers 
released an ultimatum: 
We have taken over all systems in your entire 
office and production domains, all customer 
information databases, source code 
repositories, financial records, emails. 
Shutting down [Ashley Madison] and EM 
will cost you, but non-compliance will cost 
you more: [w]e will release all customer 
records, profiles with all the customer’s 
secret sexual fantasies, nude pictures, and 
                                                
intelligence/white-papers/wp-follow-the-data.pdf (showing screenshots of various prices for 
different types of PII, financial records, and online accounts). 
17 See Ben Woods, What’s the True Value of Your Personal Data? Meet the People Who Want to Help 
You Sell it, INSIDER (Sep. 17, 2013), http://thenextweb.com/insider/2013/09/17/whats-the-
true-value-of-your-personal-data-meet-the-people-who-want-to-help-you-sell-it/ (discussing 
Handshake as a new platform where users can volunteer identifiable or anonymous personal 
information to businesses, earning $1,600 to $8,000).   
18 Brian Krebs, Online Cheating Site Ashley Madison Hacked, KREBSON SECURITY (Jul. 19, 2015, 
11:40 PM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/07/online-cheating-site-ashleymadison-hacked/. 
19 The Ashley Madison Hack . . . in 2 Minutes, CNN (Sep. 11, 2015, 11:34 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/24/technology/ashley-madison-hack-in-2-
minutes/index.html. 
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conversations and matching credit card 
transactions, real names and addresses, and 
employee documents and emails.20 
When Avid Life Media, Ashley Madison’s owner, failed to comply, the 
hackers released PII records of more than thirty-seven million members.21  
After the release, there were numerous repercussions, including the 
resignation of Avid Life Media’s CEO, increased opportunities for extortion, 
and widespread public humiliation.22  John Gibson, an Ashley Madison user 
and a pastor, committed suicide after the records release and left his wife and 
kids behind.23 
A few months prior, OPM reported a massive breach of its personnel 
systems, including 19.7 million personnel records through its clearance-
adjudication system, e-QIP.24  The breach occurred sometime around March 
2014 and OPM discovered the breach four months later.25  The e-QIP system 
contained a “treasure trove” of information related to previous crimes, 
psychological problems, and sexual history.26  It also included approximately 
5.6 million fingerprint records.27  Many cybersecurity and intelligence analysts 
                                                
20 Krebs, supra note 18. 
21 Alyssa Newcomb, Ashley Madison Hack:  What’s Included in the Data Dump, ABC NEWS (Aug. 
19, 2015, 12:27 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ashley-madison-hack-included-data-
dump/story?id=33176238. 
22 David Bisson, The Ashley Madison Hack – A Timeline, TRIPWIRE, 
http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-security/the-ashley-
madison-hack-a-timeline/ (last updated Sep. 10, 2015); see Kristen V. Brown, We Talked to 24 
Victims of the Ashley Madison Hack About Their Exposed Secrets, FUSION (Aug. 19, 2015, 7:06 PM), 
http://fusion.net/story/185647/ashley-madison-hack-victims/ (“The thing about this leak is 
that it’s a public shaming.”). 
23 See Laurie Segall, Pastor Outed on Ashley Madison Commits Suicide, CNN (Sep. 8, 2015, 7:10 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/08/technology/ashley-madison-suicide/index.html. 
24 See Brian Krebs, Catching Up on the OPM Breach, KREBS ON SECURITY (Jun. 15, 2015, 11:25 
AM). https://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/06/catching-up-on-the-opm-breach/. 
25 See id. 
26 Id. (quoting Ellen Nakashima & Lisa Rein, Chinese Hackers Go After U.S. Workers’ Personal 
Data, WASH. POST (Jul. 10, 2014) (characterizing the amount of information stolen as a 
“treasure trove”); Kim Zetter & Andy Greenburg, Why the OPM Breach is Such a Security and 
Privacy Debacle, WIRED (Jun. 11 2015, 10:40 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/06/opm-
breach-security-privacy-debacle/. 
27 See Andrea Peterson, OPM Says 5.6 Million Fingerprints Stolen in Cyberattack, Five Times as Many 
as Previously Thought, WASH. POST (Sep. 23, 2015), 
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have emphasized national-security implications with current and formal 
federal employees being potentially exposed to blackmail, identity theft, and 
counter-intelligence and collection activities.28  Furthermore, many federal 
employees have expanded their frustration and anger about the government’s 
failure to protect their PII.29 
In another turn of events, the healthcare and health insurance sectors 
faced a record number of successful attacks with millions of medical records 
stolen over the past several years, imposing over six billion in costs.30  
Interestingly, healthcare records are becoming increasingly valuable to 
cybercriminals because, unlike credit-card numbers, “medical and prescription 
records are permanent.”31  Healthcare records also provide a complete 
profile,32 which allows a greater range of exploitation options, such as 
                                                
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/23/opm-now-says-more-
than-five-million-fingerprints-compromised-in-breaches/. 
28 See Zetter & Greenburg, supra note 26 (discussing how foreign intelligence agents could use 
the information obtained from background checks to blackmail current intelligence employees 
who have access to highly classified information). What makes the OPM breach worse is that 
security clearance applicants must often disclose sensitive PII of relatives, family members, and 
friends. See Josephine Wolff, The OPM Breach Is Putting A Damper on My Thanksgiving, SLATE 
(Nov. 24, 2015, 12:52 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/11/the_opm_data_breach_is_
putting_a_damper_on_my_thanksgiving.html (“I’ll . . . tell my family members that they may 
be at risk and there’s nothing I can do about it.”). 
29 See Wolff, supra note 28; see also John Schindler, Ex-NSA Officer:  OPM Hack is Serious Breach of 
Trust, NPR (Jun. 13, 2015, :50 8:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/06/13/414149626/ex-
nsa-officer-opm-hack-is-serious-breach-of-worker-trust (discussing how the leak will create 
more vulnerable government employees, and the feeling of “betrayal” with the government’s 
failure to protect information). 
30 See Dan Munro, Data Breaches In Healthcare Totaled Over 112 Million Records In 2015, FORBES 
(Dec. 15 2015, 9:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/12/31/data-
breaches-in-healthcare-total-over-112-million-records-in-2015/ (noting there were more than 
253 healthcare breaches in 2015 with a combined total of over 112 million medical records 
stolen, approximately one-in-three Americans); see also Shannon Pettypiece, Rising Cyber Attacks 
Costing Health System $6 Billion Annually, BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2015, 6:00 AM) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-07/rising-cyber-attacks-costing-health-
system-6-billion-annually (noting that hospitals are losing $2.1 million, on average, from 
insurance fraud). 
31 Fahmida Y. Rashid, Why Hackers Want Your Health Care Data Most of All, INFOWORLD (Sep. 
14, 2015), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2983634/security/why-hackers-want-your-
health-care-data-breaches-most-of-all.html. 
32 See INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., HACKING HEALTHCARE IT IN 2016 5-6 
(2016), http://icitech.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ICIT-Brief-Hacking-Healthcare-IT-
in-2016.pdf [hereinafter ICIT REPORT] (noting that hackers will “expend significant resources” 
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“obtain[ing] prescription medicine [using] the victim’s identity.”33  Many 
victims of health-related fraud experience critical issues, such as “life-
threatening inaccuracies in their medical records,” “misdiagnosis,” and 
inaccurate prescriptions.34  In 2013, consumers paid nearly twelve-billion 
dollars of out-of-pocket costs.35   
Classic attacks on retailers and the financial sector using point-of-sale 
(POS) attacks or credit-card skimmers have not substantially abated.36  In 
2013, Target and Neiman Marcus faced similar sophisticated attacks on their 
systems.37  And though the Neiman Marcus attack was smaller, it was more 
sophisticated, resulting in more than 9,000 credit cards being fraudulently 
used.38   
A common theme for many cybersecurity incidents is that they were 
preventable had sound security measures and practices been in place prior to 
                                                
to find and obtain healthcare records because hospitals have more private information on and 
individual than any bank or employer).  
33 See Brian Krebs, A Day in the Life of a Stolen Healthcare Record, KREBS ON SECURITY (Apr. 28, 
2015, 12:46 AM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/04/a-day-in-the-life-of-a-stolen-
healthcare-record/ [hereinafter Krebs on Healthcare] (tying tax return fraud reported by 
physicians to data breaches in the healthcare sector). 
34 Medical ID Fraud Costs Consumers $12bn in Out-of-Pocket Costs, INFO SECURITY (Sep, 16 2013), 
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/medical-id-fraud-costs-consumers-12bn-in-out-
of/. 
35 See id.; see also BARBARA FILKINS, SANS INST., HEALTH CARE CYBERTHREAT REPORT 5 (2014) 
(emphasizing that unlike credit-card fraud, consumers generally cannot recover costs for 
health-care-related fraud). 
36 See DBIR 2015, supra note 3, at 35-38 (discussing trends in POS and credit-card skimming 
exploits).  POS and credit-card skimming are specific exploits designed to capture credit-card 
numbers and other financial data at the when the vendor or customer swipes a credit card.  
SYMANTEC, SPECIAL REPORT: ATTACKS ON POINT-OF-SALE SYSTEMS, V.2.0 5 (2014). Credit 
card systems handle a variety of transactions today, and although all vendors are required to 
comply with PCI-DSS, a security standard, there are vulnerabilities that can be exploited by 
attacking associated networks. Id. at 6-7. 
37 See Rip Empson, Neiman Marcus Breach Could Be Part Of Larger Holiday Cyberattack On U.S. 
Retailers, TECHCRUNCH (Jan 11, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/11/following-attack-
on-target-neiman-marcus-confirms-its-own-breach-and-could-be-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg/; 
see also Victoria Wagner Ross, Target Cyber Breach Extends, Neiman Marcus Reports a Cyber-Theft, 
EXAMINER (Jan 11, 2014, 12:35 PM), http://www.examiner.com/article/target-cyber-breach-
extends-neiman-marcus-reports-a-cyber-theft-attack. 
38 Benjamin Elgin et al., Neiman Marcus Hackers Set off 60,000 Alerts with Card Thefts, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2014, 9:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-
21/neiman-marcus-hackers-set-off-60-000-alerts-in-bagging-card-data.html. 
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(and during) an attack.39  Many companies, organizations, and agencies are 
often criticized for mishandling large-scale breaches and for failing to 
implement an effective cybersecurity program.40  For instance, OPM failed to 
encrypt PII information in the system, which is an “industry best practice.”41  
Target also missed many warning signs that, if acted on, could have prevented 
the breach from becoming a serious problem.42  Often, warnings do not help.  
In 2014, the FBI warned the healthcare industry that its systems were 
vulnerable to cyberattacks, but hackers, nevertheless, made several dozen 
successful attacks.43  Another trend is that companies, especially healthcare 
providers, have access to greater and greater amounts of data.44  
Consequently, a single compromise has greater effects. 
Even worse, most companies do little to mitigate vulnerability risks or 
make substantial security investments pre- and post-attack.45  This is partially 
                                                
39 See U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, TA15-119, TOP 30 TARGETED HIGH RISK 
VULNERABILITIES (2015), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-119A [hereinafter US-
CERT] (finding that “[eighty-five] percent of targeted attacks are preventable”).   
40 See DBIR 2015, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that 99.9% of breaches involving a vulnerability 
exploit “were compromised more than a year after the [Common Vulnerability & Exposure 
(CVE)] was published”).  See generally COMMON VULNERABILITIES & EXPOSURES, 
http://cve.mitre.org/about/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016), (A CVE “is a list of 
information security vulnerabilities and exposures that aims to provide common names for 
publicly known cybersecurity issues.). See also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, OPM U.S. 
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, SEMI ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 7-11 (2015) (noting 
several security gaps among healthcare providers under an OPM administrated health 
program). 
41 David Perera, Agency Didn't Encrypt Feds' Data Hacked by Chinese, POLITICO (last updated Jun. 
5, 2015, 9:03PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/personal-data-of-4-million-
federal-employees-hacked-118655. 
42 See A “Kill Chain” Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach, MAJORITY STAFF REPORT FOR 
CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER i (Mar. 26, 2014). 
43 See Jim Finkle, FBI Warns Healthcare Sector Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks, REUTERS (Apr. 23 2014, 
3:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-healthcare-fbi-exclusiv-
idUSBREA3M1Q920140423; see also Munro, supra note 30 (listing the top ten healthcare data 
breaches in 2015); see generally FILKINS, supra note 35, at 4-5, 7-11 (analyzing malicious traffic 
patterns and concluding there is massive security non-compliance and vulnerabilities across the 
healthcare sector). 
44 See FILKINS, supra note 35, at 12.  
45 See US-CERT, supra note 39; see also J. Craig Anderson, Identity Theft Growing, Costly to Victims, 
USA TODAY (Apr. 14, 2013, 4:38 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/04/14/identity-theft-
growing/2082179/ (noting that corporations are not investing in security and that law 
enforcement finds it difficult to investigate, leaving victims to fend for themselves). 
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because most companies or agencies are not sustaining any major financial 
loss from data breaches:46  the majority of the risk is borne by the consumer 
and credit-card issuers.47  Furthermore, many suggest that current legislative 
proposals would not fix the problem.48  And though the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) has taken affirmative steps to impose additional costs on 
companies that disregard modern-day security practices, there is still a 
substantial cost-to-risk imbalance.49  
 
 
 
                                                
46 See Erik Sherman, The Reason Companies Don’t Fix Cybersecurity, CBS NEWS (Mar. 15, 2015, 
5:30 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-reason-companies-dont-fix-cybersecurity/ 
(arguing that companies do not absorb any substantial financial damages and that the majority 
of the damage is, instead, absorbed by the economy); see also Benjamin Deen, Why Companies 
Have Little Incentive to Invest in Cybersecurity, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 4, 2015, 2:26 PM) (noting 
that target’s total losses were only $105 million, approximately 0.1% of 2014 sales); DBIR 2015, 
supra note 3, at 63 (noting that “time to market” for software development is critical and is 
prioritized over security concerns); William Roberds & Stacey L. Schreft, Data Breaches and 
Identity Theft, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA 24-31 (Sep. 2008) (Working Paper No. 2008-22), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1296131 (suggesting, through modeling, 
a steady-state imbalance between corporate liability and the cost of identity theft). 
47 See Robin Sidel, Cost of Credit-Card Fraud Is Set to Shift, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 29, 2015, 6:59 PM) 
(noting that, historically, credit-card issuers covered fraudulent transactions). 
48 See, e.g., DBIR 2015, supra note 3, at 26 (cautioning that information-sharing is “less than 
optimal” and that understanding the “true effects” of proposed legislation is essential); see also 
Benjamin Dean, Sorry Consumers, Companies Have Little Incentive to Invest in Better Cybersecurity, 
QUARTZ (Mar. 05, 2015), http://qz.com/356274/cybersecurity-breaches-hurt-consumers-
companies-not-so-much/ (suggesting that governments may prioritize intelligence gathering 
over data security, creating incentives to maintain vulnerabilities). 
49 See generally Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Enforcing Privacy Promises, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/enforcing-
privacy-promises (listing FTC enforcement actions). After a data breach occurs, many 
companies will offer credit monitoring and identity theft protection services to those affected 
for a specified period.  Jamie White, Retailers Offer Free Credit Monitoring, ID Theft Protection, 
LIFELOCK (Jan. 30, 2014). https://www.lifelock.com/education/retailers-offering-free-credit-
monitoring-id-theft-protection/.  But these victims are often re-victimized by these very credit-
monitoring services, who disregard basic safeguards for data security.  See Press Release, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Lifelock to Pay $100 million to Consumers to Settle FTC Charges it Violated 
2010 Order (Dec. 17, 2015) (noting that Lifelock failed to meet basic security standards by 
establishing and maintaining an information security plan).  Ironically, Lifelock was given the 
contract to monitor OPM data breach victims. Jennifer van der Kleut, White House Awards 
Contract for Identity Theft Protection for Millions of Victims of OPM Data Breach, LIFELOCK (Sep. 4, 
2015). 
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B. Standing and HRIT pre-Clapper 
	
Data-breach victims alleging a HRIT have historically faced various 
standing thresholds, with modern standing inquiry arguably being more 
stringent on imminent injuries.  Prior to Clapper, the circuits split on whether 
HRIT was a sufficiently imminent injury for standing purposes, with the 
Ninth and Seventh Circuits saying yes and the Third Circuit saying no.50  In 
doing so, The Ninth and Seventh Circuits used more lenient thresholds, while 
the Third Circuit required that imminent injuries be “certainly impending.”51  
 
1. Modern standing law and imminent injuries 
	
Article III limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to “cases” and 
“controversies.”52  This constitutional floor to jurisdiction has been described 
as standing law.53  However, the requirements for constitutional standing have 
expanded and contracted over time.54  Historically, standing law required a 
plaintiff to have, at the very least, a “personal stake in the outcome of the 
                                                
50 See infra Part I.B.2. 
51 See infra Part I.B.2. 
52 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992). The Constitution limits courts 
to the exercise of “strictly judicial” powers. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 355-57 
(1911) (noting that the judicial power “implies the existence of present or possible adverse 
parties, whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication”) (quoting In re Pac. Ry. 
Comm’n, 32 Fed. 241, 255). 
53 See Lujan, supra note 53, at 560 (noting that the standing requirement exists partially because 
the court’s jurisdiction is constitutionally limited to “cases” and “controversies”). The Court 
acknowledges that the “cases” and “controversies” requirement, as articulated through 
standing law, is vague, so the Court often compares prior case law with a current case-in-
question. See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) (“the standing inquiry requires 
careful judicial examination of a complaint's allegations.”). There are, however, general 
guidelines in many cases. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
1377, 1386 (2014) (holding that Article III standing generally precludes third-party lawsuits, 
lawsuits raising generalized issues that are better resolved by other branches, and lawsuits that 
fall outside the “zone-of-interests” under the particular law it seeks relief from). 
54 See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (acknowledging that the Court does 
not have a consistent and complete definition for Article III standing); Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams.’ United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (noting 
vagueness in “whether particular features [of standing are] required by Art[icle] III ex proprio 
vigore, or whether” they are self-imposed).     
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controversy.”55  But after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 56 the modern 
“irreducible constitutional minimum” for standing is more stringent;57 a 
plaintiff must demonstrate an (1) “injury-in-fact”58 that is (2) “fairly . . . 
trace[able]” to the defendant’s actions59 and (3) is likely to be “redressed by a 
favorable decision.”60  Lujan also holds that the “injury-in-fact” must be 
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not ’conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical’”61   
Contemporary standing law has tied its Article III purposes to the 
separation-of-powers; to this extent, standing prevents the courts from 
encroaching on the political branches.62  A deeply rooted implication of 
separation-of-powers doctrine and standing law is that Article III prohibits 
advisory opinions.63  There are also prudential reasons for standing law.64      
                                                
55 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 181 
(1974) (Powell, J. concurring) (reemphasizing the requirement for “a personal stake” as the 
“controlling definition” for constitutional standing). 
56 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
57 Id. at 560. 
58 Id.  The three-pronged test solidified from the Court’s opinion in Allen, 468 U.S. 737, 751 
(1984) (holding that personal injury, traceability, and redressability are the core constitutional 
components of standing), which borrowed from Valley Forge Christian Coll., supra note 55, at 472 
(holding that an “actual or threatened injury,” traceability, and redressability is an “irreducible 
minimum”).  
59 Lujan, supra note 53, at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 
41-42 (1976)). 
60 Id. at 560 (quoting Simon, supra note 60, at 38). 
61 Id. (quoting Whitmore, supra note 55, at 155). 
62 See Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2695 (2015) 
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (discussing separation-of-powers and standing law); see also Muskrat, supra 
note 53,  at 352-56 (1911) (discussing various holdings emphasizing that federal-court 
jurisdiction is limited to ‘cases’ by the Constitution and cannot be expanded by the legislature); 
see also Allen, supra note 54, at 752 (1984) (“[S]tanding is built on a single basic idea – the idea of 
separation of powers.”); F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 55, 85-86 
(2012) [hereinafter Probabilistic Standing] (noting that “separation-of-powers . . . has significantly 
influenced standing doctrine”). The Lujan standing requirements incorporate both Article III 
and separation-of-powers concerns. Lexmark, supra note 54, at 1386.  
63 See Muskrat, supra note 53, at 357-58 (acknowledging that Marbury v. Madison precludes 
advisory opinions). 
64 See Lexmark, supra note 54, at 1386 (noting “prudential,” non-Article III standing generally 
bars third-party lawsuits, lawsuits raising generalized issues that are better resolved by other 
branches, and lawsuits falling outside the “zone-of-interests” under the particular law it seeks 
relief from); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll., supra note 55, at 473-75 (1982) (noting 
“prudential principles” where plaintiffs must “generally assert [their] own legal rights and 
interests” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 
132 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF             Vol. 7, No. 1 
 
 
 Although Article III requires a concrete and particularized injury, it need 
not have already occurred; an imminent or threatened injury is sufficient.65  
But “fear-based” and heightened-risk cases are an emerging field post-Lujan’s 
imminent-injury requirements.66  Because this area creates situations where an 
alleged injury may not occur, some courts are reluctant to find standing.67  
Yet, all courts have made exceptions for sufficiently imminent injuries, 
reasoning that “plaintiffs should not have to wait for an injury to occur before 
seeking a remedy.”68  But the circuits have split over how “imminent” an injury 
should be to satisfy Article III standing requirements.69 
 
2. Pisciotta, Krottner, and Reilly, the three Pre-Clapper HRIT circuit cases 
 
Prior to Clapper, there were three similar circuit cases involving HRIT:  
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits found standing for data-breach victims in 
both Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp70 and Krottner v. Starbucks,71 while the 
                                                
727, 731-32 (1972) (requiring that the Plaintiff have a “personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy,” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
65 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (holding that a plaintiff has a sufficient 
injury when she demonstrates that she is “immediately in danger of” a direct injury from a 
statutes’ operation). 
66 See generally Brian Calabrese, Note, Fear-Based Standing:  Cognizing an Injury-in-Fact, 68 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1445, 1447-51, 1464-72 (2011) (noting that heightened risk or “anticipatory harm” 
is a subset of fear-based injury). 
67 See Probabilistic Standing, supra note 62, at 61-65 (acknowledging the Court’s concerns about 
expanding its powers under imminent injuries but pointing out that the courts have 
traditionally “exercise[ed] jurisdiction over claims for prospective relief.”); see also Diana R. H. 
Winters, False Certainty: Judicial Forcing of the Quantification of Risk, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 315, 337 
(2013) (noting the D.C. Circuit’s concerns about expanding the courts’ role by allowing 
“increased-risk claims” (quoting Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Traffic Highway Safety Admin., 489 
F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007))). 
68 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2343 (2014) (holding that plaintiffs 
facing a “credible threat” need not wait for “prosecution” before “seeking relief” (quoting 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 15 (2010)). 
69 See, e.g., Winters, supra note 67, at 335-46 (comparing the Second Circuit’s and D.C. Circuit’s 
standards for imminent injuries).  The Supreme Court recognizes that imminence is a 
“somewhat elastic concept.”  Clapper, supra note 10, at 1147 (quoting Lujan, supra note 53, at 
565 n.2). 
70 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007). 
71 638 F.3d. 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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Third Circuit denied standing in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.72 Whether a HRIT was 
sufficiently imminent for standing depended on the different thresholds each 
circuit applied.  
Pisciotta, decided in 2007, was the first Seventh Circuit case discussing 
whether a HRIT is a sufficiently imminent injury; although the Seventh 
Circuit held that the Plaintiffs did have Article III standing, it nonetheless 
concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to state any “compensable injury” under 
Indiana law.73  Old National Bancorp’s (ONB’s) servers were breached by an 
external actor, who stole bank-applicant information, including “name[s], 
address[es], [SSNs], driver’s license number[s], [birthdays], mother’s maiden 
name[s], and credit card” numbers.74  The court found that the “intrusion was 
sophisticated, intentional, and malicious.”75  And ONB notified its customers 
of the breach.76  After obtaining credit-monitoring services to protect 
themselves, ONB’s customers sued in district court, alleging ONB was 
negligent and breached their contract.77  The district court dismissed for lack 
of a cognizable injury under Indiana law because none of the Plaintiffs could 
show instances of financial loss or identity theft.78 
The Seventh Circuit reversed on the standing issue, but it affirmed the 
district court’s holding that Indiana law would not permit credit-monitoring 
services as a compensable injury.79  The Seventh Circuit held that “the injury-
in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act 
which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm that the 
                                                
72 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011). 
73 Pisciotta, supra note 71, at 633-35, 640.   
74 Pisciotta, supra note 71, at 631-32. 
75 Id. at 632. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 633-34 (noting that the district court “relied on several cases from other district courts . 
. . conclud[ing] that the federal courts lack jurisdiction because plaintiffs whose data has been 
compromised, but not yet misused, have not suffered an injury-in-fact . . .”). 
79 Pisciotta, supra note 71, at 633-34. 
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plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s actions.”80  
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Plaintiffs’ HRIT met 
the constitutional burden.81   
Similarly, Krottner, decided in 2010, was the Ninth Circuit’s first 
opportunity to consider the same issue, and the Ninth Circuit, borrowing 
from Pisciotta, held that the Plaintiffs had stated a sufficiently imminent 
injury.82  This case did not involve a malicious hacker; rather, it involved an 
opportunist who stole a Starbucks laptop containing “unencrypted names, 
addresses, and social security numbers of approximately 97,000 Starbucks 
employees.”83  Starbucks notified its employees of the theft and provided free 
credit monitoring for all affected employees for a fixed term.84  Several 
employees sued Starbucks, alleging negligence and breach of contract for the 
loss of their PII.85  Although the district court held that the employees had 
alleged a sufficiently imminent injury, it dismissed for a lack of a “cognizable 
injury under Washington law.”86  The Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that a 
                                                
80 See id. at 634, 638-39 (comparing HRIT with other types of heightened-risk cases, such as 
medical monitoring and toxic tort liability, where courts have found a sufficiently imminent 
injury.  The similarity between other types of heightened-risk cases and data-breach cases has 
been extensively argued as a basis for granting standing); Miles L. Galbraith, Comment, Identity 
Crisis:  Seeking a Unified Approach to Plaintiff Standing for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal 
Information, 62 AM. L. REV. 1365, 1387-96 (2013) (arguing that data- breach cases are 
“analogous” to classic-tort cases involving imminent harm from toxic exposure, defective 
medical devices, and environmental damage); but see Reilly, supra note 73, at 44-46 
(distinguishing toxic exposure, defective-medical device, and environmental damage cases 
because they often involve human health (as opposed to economic) and cannot often be 
resolved entirely through “monetary compensation”); Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 
998 F. Supp.2d 646, 656 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (distinguishing medical monitoring cases). 
81 Pisciotta, supra note 71, at 633-34.   
82 Krottner, supra note 72, at 1142-43. 
83 Id. at 1140. 
84 Id. at 1140-41. 
85 Id. at 1141. 
86 Id. at 1141. The Plaintiffs in Krottner ran into the same problem as Pisciotta because they did 
not allege a cognizable injury under state law. See Pisciotta, supra note 71, at 639-40 (“Plaintiffs 
have not come forward with a single case or statute [allowing credit monitoring costs] from any 
jurisdiction, authorizing the kind of action they now ask . . . to recognize . . . under Indiana 
law”); Krottner, supra note 72, at 131 (“Under Washington law, ‘[a]ctual loss or damage is an 
essential element . . . [and] [t]he mere danger of future harm . . . will not support a negligence 
action.’” (quoting Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 543 P.2d 338, 341 (Wash. 1975) (en banc)); but 
see Lone Star Nat’l Bank v. Heartland Payment Sys., 729 F.3d 421, 423, 425-26 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that the economic loss doctrine did not bar recovery in tort under New Jersey law 
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HRIT is a sufficient injury for standing because a “threatened injury 
constitutes injury in fact.”87 
In contrast, the Third Circuit decided, in Reilly, that a HRIT alone was 
too “speculative” to be a sufficient injury.88  Like ONB, “Ceridian’s Powerpay 
system” was breached, giving the attacker access to “first name[s], last 
name[s], social security number[s] . . . birth dates[s] and/or … bank account 
[information].”89  The victims sued Ceridian for “an increased risk of identity 
theft,” relying on Pisciotta’s and Krottner’s holdings.90  However, the district 
court held that HRIT, alone, was insufficient injury for standing purposes; 
and even if it was, the Plaintiffs still had no cognizable injury under state 
law.91 
The Third Circuit affirmed on appeal, holding that the Constitution 
requires an imminent injury be “certainly impending,” and a HRIT is a 
“possible future injury” that is “too speculative” to be “certainly 
impending.”92  Furthermore, the Third Circuit found that the Plaintiffs’ injury 
rested on a series of “ifs,” making the claim “attenuated.”93  Also, the Third 
Circuit held that an injury is unlikely to be “certainly impending” when it rests 
                                                
when the Defendant could reasonably foresee that card issuers would be injured by its failure 
to secure payment-card transactions). 
87 Krottner, supra note 72, at 1142. 
88 Reilly, supra note 73, at 46. Clapper seems to borrow heavily from Reilly’s reasoning since they 
both apply the “certainly impending” standard.  Both rest heavily on Whitmore v. Arkansas. See 
infra Part I.E.1. 
89 Reilly, supra note 73, at 40. 
90 Id. at 40, 44. 
91 Id. at 40-41. 
92 Id. at 42-43 (quoting Whitmore, supra note 55, at 158). 
93 See Reilly, supra note 73, at 43 (“we cannot now describe how Appellants will be injured .in 
this case .without beginning our explanation with the word ‘if’: if the hacker read, copied, and 
understood the hacked information...and if the hacker attempts to use the information, and if 
he does so successfully,  . . .only then will Appellants have suffered an injury.”). For the “if 
test,” the Third Circuit cited, Storino v. Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2003). In 
Storino the owners of a “rooming house” in the Point Pleasant Boroughs challenged the 
constitutionality of a recently passed zoning ordinance that prohibited “rooming/boarding” 
use. Despite acknowledging that New Jersey provides “vested” properties with the right to 
continuing “non-conforming” uses, the owners argued that the ordinance would eventually 
harm them because it would deprive them of their current uses.  Id. at 297. The court held that 
the alleged injury was “conjectural” because it required an “if” condition.  Id. at 297-98. 
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on “future actions of an unknown third-party.”94  Specifically, the Third 
Circuit held that the hacker’s intent was unknowable, so the Plaintiffs in Reilly 
fell even shorter than Lujan’s Plaintiffs.95  
The Third Circuit also distinguished both Pisciotta and Knotter, noting that 
both cases considered more “immediate” risks and that both cases simply 
analogized and did not discuss the constitutional threshold for imminent 
injuries.96  As the Third Circuit noted, it was undisputed in Pisciotta that the 
hack was “sophisticated, intentional, malicious,”97 also there were already 
identity theft attempts in Krottner.98  Furthermore, the Third Circuit rejected 
the defective medical device and toxic exposure analogies advanced by both 
cases because, unlike identity theft, those harms “had undoubtedly 
occurred.”99  Moreover, environmental-damage cases could not always be 
resolved by monetary compensation.100  Ultimately, the Third Circuit 
concluded that Pisciotta and Krottner did not follow the “certainly impending” 
standard for imminent injuries and, thus, were not persuasive.101  
 
C. Four standards for imminent injury and two from the Clapper majority 
  
The Supreme Court introduced several thresholds for imminence.102  
Clapper, the most recent case, introduced four distinct thresholds for how 
                                                
94 See Reilly, supra note 73, at 42 (observing that the Plaintiffs in Lujan had “control” over 
whether the injury was sufficiently “imminent” because “all [they] needed to do was [state an 
intention to] travel to the site”). 
95 See id. at 42 (concluding that Plaintiffs’ injury was “even more speculative than those . . . in 
Lujan”). 
96 See id. at 43-44 (noting that the Pisciotta court did not discuss the “certainly impending” 
threshold and how it relates to data-breach cases). 
97 Id. at 43-44 (quoting Pisciotta, supra note 71, at 632. 
98 Id. 
99 See id. at 44-46 (noting that the victims in toxic-exposure cases have the immediate concern 
of preventing further harm to their health). 
100 Id. at 44-45.  
101 See id. at 44 (describing Krottner’s and Pisciotta’s rationale as “skimpy”). 
102 See Andrew C. Sand, Note, Standing Uncertainty:  An Expected-Value Standard for Fear-
Based Injury in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 113 MICH. L. REV. 711, 712-15, 726-33 
(2015) (arguing that Clapper created three separately different standards for injury-in-fact). 
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imminent an injury must be.  Specifically, the Court rejected the Second 
Circuit’s “objective reasonable likelihood” threshold,103 reemphasized the 
“certainly impending” threshold,104 and acknowledged the “substantial risk” 
threshold.105  Alternatively, the dissent argued for a “reasonable probability” 
threshold.106  Yet, Clapper left lower courts wondering whether the “certainly 
impending” threshold only applies to surveillance cases and whether the 
“substantial risk” threshold would be used. 
 
1. The district court finds no present or future injury 
 
A coalition of human-rights attorneys and organizations challenged the 
constitutionality of Section 702 of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA), arguing that the authorization of warrantless government 
surveillance on foreign nationals overseas violated their First and Fourth 
Amendment rights.107  The Plaintiffs alleged an imminent injury because they 
had an “actual and well-founded” fear (or there was a “realistic danger”) that 
                                                
103 Clapper, supra note 10, at 1147. 
104 Id. at 1147-48. 
105 Id. at n.5. 
106 See id. at 1160-65 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (rejecting the certainly impending as an absolute 
floor to standing and arguing that the court has used lower thresholds for granting standing, 
concluding that the constitutionally required threshold is something closer to “reasonable 
probability” or “high probability”).   
107 Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 634-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) rev’d sub. 
nom., Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 119 (2d Cir. 2011) rev’d and rem., Clapper v. 
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).  Section 702 was added to the 1978 FISA by 
Section 101(a)(2) of the 2008 FISA Amendments Act (FAA).  Id. at 634; 50 U.S.C. § 
1881(a)1881a (2015).  Section 702 allows warrantless interception and collection of 
communications by non-U.S. persons residing outside of the United States when either exigent 
circumstances exist or by a favorable finding by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC).  50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)1881a (2015); see McConnell, 646 F. Supp.2d at 635-41 (describing 
surveillance procedures under Section 702); see generally EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42725, REAUTHORIZATION OF THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT (2013) (discussing the 
impacts of section 702).  Section 702 is particularly controversial because the government does 
not need to show probable cause or “specify the nature and location” of the surveillance.  
Clapper, supra note 10, at 1144. 
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their confidential communications with their clients would be monitored 
under Section 702.108     
The district court held that the Plaintiffs lacked standing because their 
surveillance fears were “abstract.”109  Specifically, the district court found that 
Section 702 did not actually target the Plaintiffs and that it was “completely 
speculative” whether the government would surveille the Plaintiffs’ 
communication.110  Furthermore, the district court noted that its conclusion 
was consistent with those in previous monitoring cases, which all similarly 
held that the fear was speculative without specific language targeting a 
plaintiff.111  
  
2. The Second Circuit finds standing using an “objectively reasonable 
likelihood” threshold 
 
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiffs had standing because 
there was an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that Section 702 would target 
their communications.112  Relying on the Court’s rationale in City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons,113 the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff can “obtain 
                                                
108 See McConnell, supra note 108, at n.12 (hinting there is little difference between the Second 
Circuit’s “actual and well-founded fear” and “realistic danger” tests except that the former is 
only used when analyzing First Amendment challenges). 
109 Id. at 645. 
110 Id. 
111 See id. at 645-47 (discussing United Presbyterian Church in the U.S v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) and Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493, 403 F.3d 644 (6th 
Cir. 2007) and noting that both monitoring cases required the Plaintiffs to be specifically 
targeted for there to be standing). 
112 Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 134-39 (2d Cir. 2011) rev’d and rem, Amnesty 
Int’l USA v. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1134 (2013).  The Second Circuit avoided opining on whether 
the required threshold was different when a plaintiff claims avoidance costs against a future 
injury versus when a plaintiff only claims a future injury.  Id. at 134.  Consequently, the Second 
Circuit analyzed both the Plaintiffs’ present-injury and future-injury under a reasonable 
likelihood standard.  Id. at 135.  But the Second Circuit hints that standing for present injuries 
based on future-anticipated harm requires a lower threshold.  Id. at 135 n.17 (“[W]e do not 
suggest that actual present injuries may only be traced to governmental action when the causal 
connection is as strong as the likelihood of injury required to base standing on contingent 
future harms.”). 
113 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
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standing” when they allege facts showing a “sufficient likelihood of future 
injury.”114  Moreover, the Second Circuit emphasized that the likelihood 
inquiry was “qualitative, not quantitative”115 and that “the risk of that harm 
need not be particularly high.”116   
Applying the threshold to the Plaintiffs’ future injury, the Second Circuit 
found a reasonable likelihood that Plaintiffs’ communications with their 
clients would be monitored under Section 702.117   In finding an objectively 
reasonable likelihood, the Second Circuit noted that intelligence agencies 
would likely use Section 702 authorities.118  Additionally, the Second Circuit 
agreed that the Plaintiffs’ clients were the type of individuals that Section 702 
aimed to monitor.119  Consequently, the Plaintiffs had standing because their 
fear of future monitoring was “reasonably likely to occur”.120      
 
3. The Clapper Court emphasizes the “certainly impending” threshold and 
acknowledges a “substantial risk” threshold 
 
The Supreme Court rejected the “objectively reasonable likelihood” 
threshold for imminent injuries as too permissive.121  Instead, the Court 
reemphasized that imminent injuries must be “certainly impending”122 and 
held that the Plaintiffs’ alleged future and present injuries fell far short of that 
threshold.123  Additionally, the Court held that the Plaintiffs’ claims failed to 
                                                
114 Clapper, supra note 108, at 135-36; see Lyons, supra note 114, at 107 n.8 (emphasizing that the 
threat’s “reality” determines standing, “not the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions”).   
115 Clapper, supra note 108, at 137 (quoting Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 637 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
116 Id. at 137 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 n. 23 (2007)).  The Second Circuit 
further held that the “totality of the circumstances” governed reasonability, and that the 
probability threshold “varies with the severity of the . . .  harm.” Id. at 137-38 (quoting Baur, 
supra note 116, at 637). 
117 Id. at 138-40. 
118 Id. at 138. 
119 Id. at 138-39. 
120 Id. at 140. 
121 Clapper, supra note 10, at 1143, 1147. 
122 Id. at 1143, 1147. 
123 Id. at 1143. 
140 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF             Vol. 7, No. 1 
 
 
even meet the “substantial risk” standard because their claim was too 
attenuated.124  Finally, the Court held that, since Plaintiffs’ fear was 
speculative, their avoidance costs could not create standing.125       
Like Reilly, the Court emphasized that an injury must be “certainly 
impending” for Article III standing.126  And the “certainly impending” 
threshold does not allow for “[a]llegations of possible future injury.”127  
Moreover, injuries that rest on “speculative fear[s]” or a “highly attenuated 
chain of possibilities” are not sufficiently imminent under the “certainly 
impending” threshold.128  
As applied, the Court held that the Plaintiffs’ future injury was speculative 
because they could not show that their communications would be imminently 
targeted.129  Furthermore, the Court held that even if the Plaintiffs’ 
communications were targeted, their injury was still speculative because it 
rested on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities.”130  Specifically, the chain 
started with a government decision to target the communications of foreign 
contacts with whom the Plaintiffs’ communicate under Section 702 authority 
and ended with a successful interception.131 Also, the Court agreed with the 
Plaintiffs’ analysis that Section 702 “at most authorizes – but does not mandate 
or direct” surveillance against Plaintiffs.132  Thus, since the Plaintiffs’ fear of 
                                                
124 Id. at 1150, n.5. 
125 Id. at 1150-52. 
126 Id. at 1147. 
127 Clapper, supra note 10 (quoting Whitmore, supra note 55, at 158). 
128 Id. at 1148. 
129 See id. at 1148-49 (noting further that the Plaintiffs failed to allege that their communications 
were even brought to a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for approval).  
130  Id. at 1148, 1150. 
131 See id. at 1148 The Court raises concerns about Plaintiffs’ theory because there is a string of 
probabilities from targeting to collection, where the interception fails, an alternate authority is 
used, or the interception does not include Plaintiffs’ communication with the client. Id.; accord 
Reilly, supra note 73, at 42 (holding that the Plaintiffs did not have standing because their claim 
of future injury required that the hacker successfully collect their personal information, intend 
to commit crimes with such information, and actually be able to use it to the detriment of the 
Plaintiffs). 
132 Id. at 1149. 
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injury was highly speculative, the Court found that the future injury failed to 
meet the stringent “certainly impending” threshold.133 
In explaining the “certainly impending” threshold, the Court’s implied 
that the threshold precluded probabilistic analysis for imminent injuries.134  
However, the Court acknowledged that it had previously found standing for 
some injuries using a “substantial risk” threshold.135  But in doing so, the 
Court neither reaffirmed nor defined the threshold.136  Yet, the Court held 
that the Plaintiffs failed to meet the “substantial risk” threshold because their 
claim was highly attenuated.137 
 
4. The Clapper dissent argues the right balance is between a “high” and a 
“reasonable probability” 
 
The Clapper dissent disagreed with the majority that “certainly 
impending” was the constitutional threshold and argued, instead, that the 
Plaintiffs had a “high likelihood” of being surveilled under Section 702.138  
Justice Breyer argued that the standing threshold is “elastic,” ranging from a 
fair probability to a certainly impending threshold.139  For instance, the Court 
found standing for “probabilistic injuries” – something less than certainty.140  
                                                
133 Clapper, supra note 10, at 1150. 
134 See id. at 1147-48 (noting that Plaintiffs’ “fail[ure] to offer any evidence that their 
communications have been monitored . . . substantially undermines their standing theory”). By 
requiring evidence of interception and holding that injury theories requiring “if” statements 
speculative, the Court implies that the injury must be literally certain. See infra part II.B.1. 
135 Id. at 1150 n.5.  The D.C. Circuit’s substantial risk test relies on probability determinations; 
specifically, it examines whether an alleged injury has a substantial chance of occurring.  See 
infra part II.B.3. 
136 See id.  The Court affirms the “substantial risk” threshold a year later in Susan B. Anthony List 
v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014).  But the Court has not provided definitive guidance 
on when “substantial risk” applies.  See Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or 
Three Competing Philosophies of Standing Law? 81 TENN. L. REV. 211, 268-69 (2014) (noting lower 
courts’ confusion about when to apply “substantial risk” analysis).    
137 Clapper, supra note 10, at 1150 n.5. 
138 Clapper, supra note 10, at 1157-58, 1160-61 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
139 See id. at 1160 (recognizing that “imminence” is an “elastic concept” (quoting Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992)). 
140 See id. at 1160-61 (noting that the court has allowed standing, in many case, on “probabilistic 
injuries” and emphasizing that “certainly” should not “literally define[] . . . impending”). 
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In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms141 found standing on a “substantial risk” 
of injury.142  Thus, imminent injuries do not require “literal certainty,” only a 
sufficient likelihood of occurrence.143  Thus, Justice Breyer argued that the 
constitutional threshold was closer to a “’high probability’ or ‘reasonable 
probability.’”144 
When determining that the Plaintiffs had a “high likelihood” of being 
surveilled, Justice Breyer pointed to several factors that raised the likelihood 
of Plaintiffs being harmed under Section 702.145  He noted that the 
“Government has a strong motive to listen to” these ongoing discussions,146  
and that the Government has previously intercepted similar types of 
communications.147  Taking in these factors as a whole, Justice Breyer 
concluded that Plaintiffs’ fear was not “speculative.”148 
 
D. District courts disagree as to whether HRIT injuries are precluded under Clapper 
 
After Clapper, data-breach litigation has increased as more companies are 
compelled by state laws to report any exposure or loss of PII.149  Different 
district courts resolving such cases have reached two conflicting conclusions 
from Clapper, Pisciotta, Knotter, and Reilly: the first is that Clapper now requires a 
                                                
141 561 U.S. 139 (2010). 
142  Id. at 1160-63 (quoting Monsanto Co., supra note 142, at 153); see, e.g., id. at 1161 (noting that 
the Court in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), found standing when nursing home 
residents faced a “sufficiently substantial” risk of being transferred to a “less desirable home” 
under a new regulation (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 999-1001).  
143 Id. at 1160, 1162. 1165. 
144 See id. at 1165 (arguing the Courts deny standing when an injury is “less likely” to occur).  
Substantial risk could be akin to high probability of occurrence and objectively reasonable 
likelihood could be likened to a mere possibility of occurrence. Compare notes 112-116 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s test) with notes 296-301 and accompanying 
text (discussing D.C. Circuit’s substantial risk test). 
145 Id. at 1157, 1159 (“The upshot is that (1) similarity of content, (2) strong motives, (3) prior 
behavior, and (4) capacity all point to a very strong likelihood the Government will 
intercept...at least some of the . . .plaintiffs’ communications.”). 
146 Id. at 1158. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 1160. 
149 See DAVID ZETOONY ET AL., 2015, DATA BREACH LITIGATION REPORT 4 (2015) (showing 
that the number of class action complaint filings over an eighteen-month period has grown). 
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higher threshold for imminent injuries, in all cases and, consequently, older 
circuit opinions no longer control;150 the second is that Clapper can be 
reconciled with previous cases because either (a) Clapper only emphasized 
heightened scrutiny for government surveillance151 or (b) Clapper 
acknowledged the “substantial risk” threshold and, therefore, did not 
foreclose probabilistic future-injuries.152  
Many courts consistently hold that Clapper forecloses all HRIT cases by 
rejecting the “objectively reasonable likelihood” test and by emphasizing that 
“possible future injur[ies]” are insufficient for Article III standing.153  For 
instance, the court in In re Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) 
Backup Tape Data Theft Litigation interpreted the “certainly impending” 
threshold to bar risk-based (probabilistic) analysis, holding that the “degree by 
which the risk of harm has increased is irrelevant.”154  Similarly, other courts 
do not consider the amount or sensitivity of the information stolen, the intent 
of the hacker (to the extent it is known), or whether anyone in the class had 
                                                
150 See In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 
14, 25-26, 28 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that Clapper rejected the “objectively reasonable likelihood” 
threshold and holding that Clapper has overruled pre-Clapper circuit opinions using lower 
thresholds for imminent injuries). 
151 See In re Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp.3d 2d 943, 960-63 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding 
that Clapper “reiterated an already well-established framework” and that victims can still sue 
under a theory of heightened risk when their personal information is wrongfully disclosed). 
152 See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1211-16 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(holding that Clapper did not change standing law and that injuries causing a “substantial risk” 
of harm are still allowed). 
153 Clapper, supra note 10, at 1147; see Peters, supra note 11, at 855 (holding that under Clapper, an 
increased risk of harm from data breaches, alone, does make an injury “certainly impending”); 
see also Storm, supra note 11, at 364-68 (noting that even if the identity-theft risk was “likely or 
probable,” it would still fail to meet the certainly-impending threshold); see also Strautins v. 
Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 875-79 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“Clapper compels 
rejection . . . that an increased risk of identity theft is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement for standing.”); In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-cv-8617, 2013 WL 
4759588, at *2, *5 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 3, 2013) (“the increased risk of identity theft is insufficient to 
convey standing . . . .”). 
154 See In re SAIC, supra note 151, at 25 (responding to the Plaintiffs’ assertion that they are “9.5 
times more likely . . . to become victims of identity theft”); but see Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (“An injury can hardly be said to be 
‘certainly impending’ if there is less than a [twenty] percent chance of it occurring.”). 
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already suffered identity theft.155   However in other instances, the courts have 
quantified the “certainly impending” threshold by requiring that the 
probability of harm rise to a particular level before it finds a sufficiently 
imminent injury.156   
In denying standing under the “certainly impending” threshold, many 
courts apply Reilly’s and Clapper’s “if test” to HRIT cases.157  Specifically, the 
injury is speculative under the “certainly impending” threshold when it 
requires an ‘if’ condition to be satisfied.158  For instance, in a data-breach case, 
a future injury occurs only “if the hacker read, copied, and understood the 
hacked information, and if the hacker attempts to use the information and if 
he does so successfully.”159  Since many data-breach victims cannot 
demonstrate an identity theft without using the word “if,” many courts have 
found their injury speculative.160  Additionally, the courts have also expressed 
concerns about the uncertainty of the hacker’s actions as an “independent 
third party,” as noted in both Reilly and Clapper.161  Because the court cannot 
                                                
155 See Peters, supra note 11, at 856 (noting that Clapper resolved the circuit split from Knotter, 
Pisciotta, and Reilly, and denied Plaintiffs standing even though there were some instances of 
attempted identity theft); In re Barnes & Noble, 2013 WL 4759588 at *2, *5 (declining to grant 
standing even though there was instance of identity theft). 
156 See Galaria, supra note 155, 654 (requiring at a least twenty percent chance of occurring). 
157 See infra notes 281-289 and accompanying text; see also Green v. eBay Inc., CIV.A. No. 14-
1688,. 2015 WL 2066531, at *5 (E.D. La. May 4, 2015) (noting that whether the Plaintiff 
suffers an injury “depends on numerous variables”); Peters, supra note 11, at 854 (noting the 
Plaintiff “cannot describe [her] injurie[s] without . . . the word ‘if.” (quoting Storino v. Point 
Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 298 (3d. Cir. 2003))); Storm, supra note 11, at 365 (discussing 
Reilly’s “if” test and applying it to a data breach case); cf. In re Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc. Data 
Breach Litig., CIV.A. No. 13–7418, 2015 WL 1472483, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2015) appeal field 
(noting Reilly’s holding that physical theft (as opposed to intrusion) creates an even more 
attenuated injury because the abilities of the “crook” to take advantage of the theft are 
unknown). 
158 Clapper, supra note 10, at 1148 (2013); Reilly, supra note 73, at 43. 
159 Reilly, supra note 73, at 43. 
160 Storm, supra note 11, at 365. 
161 See Clapper, supra note 10, at 1150, 1164 n.5 (declining to support standing when injuries rely 
on “independent actors”); Lujan, supra note 53, at 562 (noting the court’s reluctance to find 
standing when the “asserted injury arises from the government’s . . . regulation . . . of someone 
else” who is not “before the courts” because the courts cannot “control” or “predict” their 
actions); Reilly, supra note 73, at 42 (noting that the injury “is dependent on entirely speculative, 
future actions of an unknown third-party”); See In re SAIC, supra note 151, at 25-26 (“Courts . . 
. are reluctant to grant standing where the alleged future injury depends on . . .the actions of. an 
independent party.”). 
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find an injury without first assuming that the hacker, thief, or other actor will 
have the knowledge and the will to exploit the stolen information, the court 
relying on Clapper and/or Reilly will find no standing.162  The reasoning behind 
the court’s reluctance for standing when the injury depends on third-party 
actions is also a basis for distinguishing analogies to medical devices, toxic 
exposure, and environmental damage.163 
On the other hand, other courts disagree that Clapper found Article III 
standing under a HRIT by relying on previous circuit holdings and 
distinguishing Clapper because Clapper the constitutionality of surveillance law 
and, thus, did not change standing law.164  To some extent, this is because 
Clapper partially relied on Laird v. Tatum.165  Consequently, there were 
conflicting views about how far Laird’s holding went in framing what kinds of 
“fear-based injur[ies]” or imminent injuries are acceptable.166  Because Clapper 
relies partially on Laird’s holdings, there is reasonable confusion as to whether 
Clapper’s interpretation of a stringent “certainly impending” standard for 
imminent injuries is more specific towards surveillance law, or whether it 
covers all cases concerning imminent injury.167  This premise is further 
                                                
162 See In re Horizon Healthcare Services, 2015 WL 1472483 at *6 (holding that injures depending 
on a “third party bandit” are “inadequate” for Article III standing); see also Galaria, supra note 
155, at 655 (holding that the Plaintiffs’ future injury is speculative because it depends on third-
party actors); Polanco v. Omnicell, Inc. 988 F. Supp. 2d 451, 466-67 (D.N.J. 2013) (discussing 
Reilly and assumed third-party actions). 
163 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
164 See In re Adobe Sys., supra note 153, at 1211-14 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (declining to adopt Adobe’s 
argument that Clapper “intended a wide reaching revision” of standing and noting that the 
circumstances in Clapper were more sensitive because they concerned whether the government 
had violated the Constitution); Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL 
3511500, at *3-5 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 14, 2014) (disagreeing that Clapper overruled Pisciotta and noting 
that Driehaus upholds a lower standing threshold); In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer 
Data Sec. Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961-62 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that Krottner and Clapper 
can be reconciled because “real and immediate” and “certainly impending” are essentially the 
same standard). 
165 92 S. Ct. 2318, 2321-23 (1972). Laird also concerned surveillance law. 
166 See Sand, supra note 102, at 716-21 (discussing Laird and arguing that three interpretations of 
Laird emerged on the Supreme Court). 
167 See Clapper, supra note 10 at 1152 (discussing Laird); John L. Jacobus & Benjamin B. Watson, 
Clapper v. Amnesty International and Data Privacy Litigation: Is a Change to the Law “Certainly 
Impending”? 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 5, 48-51, 81 (2014) (noting that courts remain split on 
Clapper’s implication in data-breach cases); see also Moyer, supra note 165, at *6 (distinguishing 
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supported by Clapper’s language, holding that the court is wary of granting 
standing where intelligence and “foreign affairs” are involved.168 
Some courts acknowledge that Clapper reemphasized the stringent 
“certainly impending” threshold for imminent injuries, but note Clapper’s 
willingness to accept some imminent injuries where there is a “substantial 
risk” of harm.  And these courts analyze data-breach cases under both 
standards with various outcomes.169  However, other courts acknowledge a 
“substantial risk” threshold but do not offer any discussion on how the 
threshold affects a Plaintiffs’ HRIT case.170  Still other courts, like the court in 
SAIC, have quantified the “substantial risk” threshold of harm because eighty 
percent of the victims may not experience identity theft.171 
One crucial discriminating factor that district courts do look to when 
finding standing is whether some victims, within a class, have already 
experienced successful or attempted identity theft.172  Other courts consider 
the time between the lawsuit and the actual breach, arguing that the longer a 
victim goes without experiencing any attempted or actual identity theft, the 
                                                
Clapper to “national security and constitutional issues”); Strautins, supra note 154, at at 878 n.11 
(noting that the court makes closer examinations of standing when Plaintiffs challenge actions 
“by the Legislative or Executive branches of government”). 
168 Clapper, supra note 10 at 1147. 
169 See Remijas, supra note 12, at 693-694 (arguing the Supreme Court did not “jettison” the 
‘‘substantial risk’” standard); see also In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 956-57 (D. 
Nev. 2015) (noting that “substantial risk” and Krottner’s standard for imminent injury are the 
same); In re SAIC, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 25-26 (noting that a Plaintiff can plead a sufficient risk if 
the “risk of harm” is “substantial); Moyer, supra note 165, at *4, *5 (relying on the “substantial 
risk” standard to find standing). 
170 See Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 663-65 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (acknowledging 
the “substantial risk” standard but granting standing based on previous instances of identity 
theft); Strautins, supra note 154, at 876, 876 n.8 (acknowledging “substantial risk” but, 
nevertheless, holding that Plaintiffs do not meet the “certainly impending” threshold); In re 
Barnes & Noble, supra note 156, at *3, *5 (acknowledging “substantial risk” as a standard but 
holding that an “increased risk of identity theft” is not enough for standing). 
171 In re SAIC, supra note 151, at 26 (holding that the probability is insufficient to meet the D.C. 
Circuit’s requirement that there is “(i) a substantially increased risk of harm and (ii) a substantial 
probability of harm with that increase taken into account” (quoting Public Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l 
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).  
172 See Enslin, supra note 171, at 664-65 (distinguishing Reilly and Clapper because the Plaintiff 
had to spend “time, effort, and money” to mitigate actual identity theft); In re SAIC, supra note 
151, at 33-34 (allowing two of thirty-three identity theft cases to proceed because they alleged 
actual injury). 
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less likely she has a sufficiently “immediate” injury.173   There are, yet, other 
courts that distinguish between the sophisticated hacker and the physical 
thief, arguing that it is more plausible that a sophisticated hacker can 
successfully exploit the PII.174  Also, on the administrative side, the courts 
have supported federal agencies’ claims on mere allegations that a data breach 
could potentially cause millions of dollars in loss from fraud and identity 
theft.175 
 
E. Remijas recognizes that previous and subsequent Supreme Court cases have not 
consistently applied Clapper’s “certainly impending” threshold. 
 
The Clapper decision created confusion amongst the circuits about how 
far its heightened threshold went in other contexts.  There were several major 
points of confusion.  First, the “certainly impending” standard was never 
uniformly applied in every case.  Second, many previous and subsequent cases 
had found standing on lower thresholds that did not focus on immediacy and 
certainty.  Third, the Driehaus Court reaffirmed that “substantial risk” 
threshold for determining standing was valid.  Consequently, the Remijas 
Court recognized these discrepancies and found standing for HRIT victims 
on the “substantial risk” standing.  In doing so, the Remijas Court reminded 
courts not to “overread” Clapper. 
 
 
                                                
173 See Remijas, supra note 170, at 693 (disagreeing that the Plaintiffs claim to standing falls as 
“more time passes between a data breach and an instance of identity theft” (quoting In re 
Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1215, n.5)); In re Zappos, supra note 170, at 957-59 (noting that Plaintiffs 
claim that injury was imminent may have been credible in 2012, but cannot confer standing  
after “three-and-a-half-years” pass without actual evidence of identity theft). 
174 See In re Adobe Sys., supra note 153, at 1215-16 (rhetorically questioning why a sophisticated 
hacker would “target and steal” personal information “if not to misuse it”). 
175 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 622-24 (D.N.J. 2014). 
148 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF             Vol. 7, No. 1 
 
 
1. Whitmore v. Arkansas establishes the “certainly impending” threshold for 
imminent injuries 
 
In Clapper, Justice Breyer noted in his dissent that “’imminence’ is . . . a 
somewhat elastic concept.” 176 Along those lines, Justice Breyer correctly 
noted that in Clapper the “certainly impending” language was not always used 
as a constitutionally minimum threshold.177  The Court in Whitmore v. 
Arkansas178 transformed the “certainly impending” requirement from a 
sufficient threshold to a necessary condition.179  
After Whitmore, the language changed to require “[a] threatened injury 
must be “’certainly impending.’”180  From there, the “certainly impending” 
threshold later appeared in Lujan, where Justice Scalia explicitly relates the 
standard to a time dimension and the certainty of injury.181  From Lujan and 
Whitmore, the “certainly impending” threshold became the requirement for the 
Clapper Plaintiffs.182 
 
                                                
176 Clapper, supra note 10, at 1160 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
177 Id. 
178 495 U.S. 149 (1990). 
179 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160; see Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158 (“A threatened injury must be 
“certainly impending’” to constitute injury in fact” (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers 
Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979))).  But Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, which was quoted in 
Babbitt, used “certainly impending” as a sufficient standard, not a necessary one.  See 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 554, 593–95 (1923) (noting if the harm “is certainly 
impending, that is enough”).  A review of cases prior to Whitmore used the sufficient standard.  
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979); Blanchette v. Conn. 
Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974). 
180 Id. at 158 (quoting Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298). 
181 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 553, 566 n.2 (1992) (holding that the 
imminence requirement is exceptionally important when the “acts necessary to make the injury 
happen are at least partly within the plaintiff’s own control” to prevent the courts from 
deciding cases without an injury-in-fact).  Justice Scalia also emphasized that “imminence” is 
not limited to situations where an injury is dependent on a third-party actor. Id. 
182 See supra Part I.C.3. and accompanying notes. 
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2. Prior Supreme Court cases have applied lower thresholds in different 
contexts 
 
Although the Court insisted that imminent injuries must meet the 
“certainly impending” threshold, the Court has previously found standing 
under lower thresholds.  For instance, cases involving environmental 
regulation or First Amendment challenges have not invoked the “certainly 
impending” threshold. 
The Court has found standing where a party is at “substantial risk” of 
falling within the scope of an allegedly unconstitutional criminal statute and 
does not require an inevitable conflict between a statute’s operation and a 
party’s activity.183  For instance, the Court found standing in Babbitt v. United 
Farm Workers National Union184 when there was a “realistic danger” that United 
Farm Workers (UFW) would face prosecution under a state statute that made 
it unlawful to use “dishonest, untruthful, and deceptive publicity” when 
influencing agricultural consumers.185  And where there is a “credible threat,” 
a plaintiff “should not be required to await and undergo a criminal 
prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.”186 
The Court has also applied “substantial risk” thresholds when deciding 
environmental regulatory challenges.  For instance, the Court granted 
standing in Massachusetts v. EPA,187 holding that the EPA’s “refusal to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions”188 created both an “’actual’ and [an] ‘imminent’” 
                                                
183 See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (“[I]t is not necessary that petitioner first 
expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims 
deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.”).  
184 442 U.S. 289 (1979). 
185 See id. at 297–99, 301–02 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1385(B)(8) (2016)) (finding 
standing when a plaintiffs’ fear of prosecution is not “imaginary or wholly speculative,” even if 
the “criminal penalty provision . . . may never be applied”). 
186 Id. at 298 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)). 
187 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
188 Id. at 521.  The Court creates some ambiguity within the standing issue by holding that 
Massachusetts has “special solicitude.”  See id. at 520 (emphasizing that “States are not normal 
litigants [when] invoking federal jurisdiction” (quoting Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 
U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Id. at 518. 
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injury to the Plaintiffs.189  The EPA had interpreted that “air pollutants,” 
within the meaning of Clean Air Act, did not include motor- vehicle carbon 
emissions, so the agency had no authority to regulate it.190  Conversely, 
Massachusetts argued that if the EPA did not regulate “greenhouse gas 
emissions,” the sea level could rise and potentially damage coastal lands.191  
The Court agreed, pointing to “objective and independent assessment[s]”192 
concluding that greenhouses gases have already caused “significant harms.”193  
The Court also acknowledged testimony that “[fourteen] acres of land per 
miles of coastline” could be lost “by [the year] 2100.”194  Thus, the Court 
concluded that Massachusetts had a “remote” risk of “catastrophic” injury, 
which is sufficient for Article III standing.195 
Another example is Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms where the Court 
found standing when Geertson sued the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APIHS) when it failed to conduct an environmental impact 
assessment prior to deregulating genetically engineered alfalfa seeds, as 
required by the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act.196  Geertson argued 
that by failing to issue an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), there was 
high risk that non-modified alfalfa seeds would be contaminated by 
genetically modified seeds, and conventional famers would have to raise 
prices to cover for testing and contamination control.197  The district court 
                                                
189 Id. at 521 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).  
190 See id. at 521, 528 (noting EPA’s conclusion that “climate change was so important” it could 
not “address it” without some explicit guidance from Congress). 
191 Id. at 499. 
192 Id. at 521 (quoting Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 
Fed. Reg. 52922-02, 52930 (Sept. 8, 2003)). 
193 Id. at 521. 
194 Id. at 523 n.20. 
195 Id. at 526.  The Court, at least in this case, supported two additional theories.  The first is 
that “even a small probability of injury . . . create[s] a case or controversy.”  Id. at 525 n.23 
(quoting Village of Elk Grove v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993)).  The second theory 
is that the more severe an alleged future injury could be, the less likely it needs to be for 
standing purposes.  Id. (citing Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 
1234 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).   
196 561 U.S. 139, 144, 153 (2010). 
197 Id. at 153–56. 
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held there was a “reasonable probability” of contamination, and the Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that there was a “significant” or “substantial risk of 
gene flow” to non-modified alfalfa.198  In doing so, the Court acknowledged 
that Geertson’s expenses to avoid contamination were reasonable.199  
 
3. Driehaus reaffirms the “substantial risk” test as a valid threshold for 
imminent injuries 
 
Although the Court had arguably left the question of whether “substantial 
risk” was still a valid threshold, it reaffirmed the “substantial risk” test in 
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus.200  In Driehaus, the Court held that Susan B. 
Anthony List (SBAL), an anti-abortion advocacy group, had standing to 
challenge an Ohio statute criminalizing “false statement[s]” about the “voting 
record of a candidate or public official” during any “nomination or election” 
campaign.201  SBAL had publically accused a congressional candidate, 
Driehaus, of voting for the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which “includes 
taxpayer-funded abortion.”202  In response, Driehaus went to the Ohio 
Elections Commission, which investigated whether SBAL had made false 
statements about his voting record.203  Consequently, SBAL challenged the 
                                                
198 See id. at 141, 151–52 (rejecting the argument that there was no imminent injury because 
there was no way of knowing how the environmental impact analysis would turn out). 
199 See id. at 154–55 (noting that the additional costs to test crops is a valid injury “even if their 
crops are not actually infected”). 
200 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014). 
201 Id. at 2338 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21(B) (Lexis 2013)).  Ohio’s statute 
allowed anyone with “personal knowledge” to “file a complaint with the Ohio Elections 
Commission.”  Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.153(A) (Lexis Supp. 2014)).  Once a 
complaint was filed, the Commission would create a panel and hold a hearing to determine 
whether there was probable cause of a violation.  Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
3517.156(B)(1), (C) (Lexis 2013)).  If there was probable cause, the full Commission held a 
more extensive hearing, and if there was “clear and convincing evidence” of a violation, the 
Commission was required to either “refer the matter to the relevant county prosecutor” or 
“issue a reprimand.” Id. at 2339 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3517.155(D)(1) (2) (Lexis 
Supp. 2014)) (citing OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3517-1-10(E) (2008); § 3517-1-14(D)). 
202 Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2339 (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 525 Fed. Appx. 415, 
416 (6th Cir. 2013) (unreported) rev’d, Driehaus, 134 S. Ct.). 
203 Id. 
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statute as a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.204  But before 
anything could proceed, Driehaus lost the election and withdrew his SBAL 
complaint.205  Still, SBAL moved forward with its constitutional claim, 
arguing that the statute “chill[s]” First Amendment speech because SBAL 
intends to operate similarly in the future, and that modus operand would 
likely trigger the statute’s criminal provisions.206  But the district court 
dismissed for a lack of concrete injury.207  And the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
holding there is no imminent injury because SBAL did not have any “plans to 
lie . . . in the future.”208  
The Supreme Court reversed and agreed with SBAL and COAST, 
holding that both organizations faced an imminent injury.209  The Court 
found standing on three points: (1) SBAL’s expressed intent to continue 
activities that would likely trigger the statute;210 (2) the added threat of 
                                                
204 Id. at 2339–40.  The SBAL suit alleged that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional on its face 
and as-applied.  Id. at 2340.  There have been a number of First Amendment challenges under 
a theory that the statute “chills” free speech because the statute is overbroad; the courts have 
been more willing to grant standing in these cases.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and 
Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1321–22 (2000) (noting that 
the courts will allow facial challenges, involving the First Amendment, when the statute has 
“too many unconstitutional applications” and that the courts are sensitive about this doctrine 
because it bypasses traditional third-party standing rules).  For non-First Amendment 
overbreadth challenges, the court has been fairly restrictive on facial challenges. See United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (holding that, outside of First Amendment 
challenges, overbreadth challenges require a showing that the statute is unconstitutional in every 
case); see also Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth:  Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule 
Requirement, 48 AM. U.L. REV. 359, 360–67 (1998) (discussing overbreadth facial challenges and 
Salerno).  But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CAL. L. REV. 
915 (2011) (arguing that in many Supreme Court terms, facial challenges had a higher success 
rate than as-applied challenges). 
205 See Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2340 (noting that SBAL adjusted its pleading to a theory of 
imminent injury, arguing that it faces future financial burdens in defending itself should 
another complaint arise under the statute); see also Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, Nos. 11-
3894, 11-3925, 2013 WL 1942821, at *3 (6th Cir. May 13, 2013) (noting that there was no “final 
decision” on SBAL). 
206 Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2340. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 2340–41 (quoting Driehaus, 2013 WL 1942821, at *7). 
209 Id. at 2347. 
210 Id. at 2343–44. 
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criminal prosecution;211 and that (3) the “threat of future enforcement . . . 
[was] substantial.”212    
The court relied on Babbitt213 and held that SBAL’s expressed intent to 
continue discussing candidates’ voting records fell within the statute’s 
scope.214  Moreover, the Court found that, in addition to “administrative 
action,” both organizations faced criminal prosecution from the statute’s 
operation, and this layered threat created a sufficiently imminent injury.215  
More importantly, the Court found that the “threat of future enforcement of 
the false statement statute is substantial.”216  In doing so, the Court made a 
direct comparison to Clapper and noted that the Commission’s probable-cause 
finding implies past enforcement, which is “good evidence that the threat . . . 
is not ‘chimerical.’”217   
 
                                                
211 Id. at 2346. 
212 Id. at 2345. 
213 See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (“When the plaintiff has 
alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional 
interest, but proscribed by a statute, there exists a credible threat of prosecution [and] he 
‘should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of 
seeking relief.’” (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973))).   
214 Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2343–45. 
215 Id. at 2345–46.  For standing under a threatened prosecution theory, the plaintiff must show 
that her behavior will likely lead to criminal prosecution under a challenged statute; it is not 
enough that the plaintiff is pleading a possible future injury based on “[p]ast exposure to illegal 
conduct” that does not have “present adverse effects.”  See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 
495–97 (1974) (noting a lack of any “allegations that any relevant criminal statute . . . is 
unconstitutional”).  This slightly distinguishes pre-enforcement challenges with heightened risk 
arguments.  See Calabrese, supra note 67, at 1460–71 (distinguishing “pre-enforcement fear” and 
“anticipatory harm); compare Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105(1983) (denying standing to 
challenge anticipatory fear of police chokeholds because it was speculative that it could happen 
again) with Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 14–16 (2010) (granting standing in 
a pre-enforcement challenge when a statute outlawed assisting certain organizations). 
216 Driehaus, 134 S. Ct.  at 2345. 
217 Id. (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974).  In Steffel, the Court found a 
sufficient injury-in-fact when Plaintiff challenged a Georgia statute prohibiting “handbilling” 
after he was told by police on two different occasions that he would be arrested if he continued 
to handbill at a shopping center, and after his associate was actually arrested.  Steffel, 415 U.S. at 
454–56, 459, 471–72. 
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4. The Remijas Court finds standing for HRIT victims under the “substantial 
risk” standard 
 
Remijas is the first circuit court case on standing in HRIT post-Clapper.218  
The Seventh Circuit found standing for Neiman Marcus breach victims, 
reversing the District Court’s judgment and holding that Clapper did not 
foreclose HRIT cases under the “substantial risk” threshold.219  Additionally, 
Remijas cautioned that Clapper should not be “overread” to have changed 
standing law.220  Specifically, Remijas distinguished Clapper on its facts, noting 
that the Court did not find standing because the Plaintiffs claims were highly 
attenuated in that specific case.221  
Neiman Marcus announced on January 23, 2014 that its servers were 
breached by malware.222  The malware had allowed attackers to skim nearly 
1.1 million payment cards between July 16 and October 30, 2013, more than 
six months prior.223  Immediately following the attack, many Neiman Marcus 
customers reported credit-card fraud.224   
Shortly afterwards, Neiman Marcus reported another successful second 
attack on January 29, 2016, where hackers used brute-force225 attempts to 
                                                
218 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). 
219 Id. at 696–97. 
220 Id. at 694. 
221 Id. at 693. 
222 Byron Acohido, Timeline: Target, Neiman Marcus Disclosures, USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2014, 11:33 
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/cybertruth/2014/01/23/timeline-target-neiman-
marcus-disclosures/4799153/.) 
223 Id.  The disclosure occurred shortly after an outside security analyst had suspected a breach.  
Brian Krebs, Hackers Steal Card Data from Neiman Marcus, KREBS ON SECURITY (Jan. 10, 2014, 
6:56 PM), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/01/hackers-steal-card-data-from-neiman-
marcus; see Lily Hay Newman, A 17-Year Old Was Behind the Target, Neiman Marcus Credit Card 
Hacks, SLATE (Jan. 20, 2014, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/01/20/target_neiman_marcus_credit_card_
number_hacks_were_caused_by_a_17_year_old.html) (noting that the timing of Neiman 
Marcus’ disclosure was controversial).     
224 Tracy Kitten, Neiman Marcus Reports New Breach, BANK INFO SECURITY (Feb. 4, 2016). 
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/new-neiman-marcus-breach-authentication-must-change-a-
8843. 
225 Brute Force is a basic technique where an attacker randomly guesses a targets’ username and 
password to gain access.  See MILES TRACY ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF SCI.  & TECH., DEPT. OF 
COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. 800-44, VERSION 2, GUIDELINES ON SECURING PUBLIC WEB 
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access 5,200 accounts.  Neiman Marcus reported that there were nearly 
seventy successful breaches with subsequent fraudulent purchases. 
The victims sued Neiman Marcus under “negligence, breach of implied 
contract . . . unfair and deceptive business practices,” and other common law 
tort theories.226  The district court acknowledged that some 9,200 payment 
cards belonging to 350,000 customers were fraudulently used.227  Although 
the District Court used the “certainly impending” threshold, it distinguished 
Clapper’s analysis as “especially rigorous” because it implicated national 
security and constitutional issues.228  Instead, the District Court reconciled 
Pisciotta and Clapper by holding that the line between imminent and speculative 
injury was confirmed data theft.229  But this did not save the plaintiffs’ case 
because they did not have a HRIT, only a risk for future fraudulent charges.230  
And fraudulent charges is not sufficiently “concrete” because the victims 
were reimbursed for the fraudulent transactions.231 
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that all 350,000 class members had 
standing at the pleading stage.232  The Seventh Circuit held that probabilistic 
injuries, such as HRIT, were still allowed under the “substantial risk” 
threshold.233  The Seventh Circuit further held that HRIT victims “should not 
                                                
SERVERS 7-12, 7-13 (2007) (defining brute force attacks).  Even though the technique is time-
tested, there are many ways to harden systems against brute-force attacks, and there was 
skepticism among some experts as to whether this was a brute-force attack.  Kitten, supra note 
224. 
226 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 2014 WL 4627893, No. 14 C 1735, *1 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 16, 
2014) (unreported) rev’d, Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at *2, *3 
229 See id. at *3 (distinguishing various cases on the likelihood of data misuse). 
230 See id. at *3–4 (acknowledging that the 350,000 victims may be at imminent risk of future 
fraudulent charges but holding that this translated to a “certainly impending risk of identity 
theft” was “a leap too far”). Although the District Court did not explain its rationale for 
drawing the distinction, it was probably discussing the differences between identity theft and 
identity fraud.  See KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RES. SERV., R40599, IDENTITY THEFT: TRENDS 
AND ISSUES 3 (2014) (describing identity theft as a specific form of identity fraud).  This 
distinction may have been drawn because the only data exposed was credit card information. 
Acohido, supra note 222. 
231 Id. Remijas, 2014 WL 4627893, at *3. 
232 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015). 
233 Id. at 693 (noting “Clapper’s recognition that a substantial risk will sometimes suffice” for 
standing). 
156 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF             Vol. 7, No. 1 
 
 
have to wait [for] . . . credit-card fraud” to occur if there is an “’objectively 
reasonable likelihood’” of it occurring.234  Finally, the Seventh Circuit raised 
concerns that requiring identity theft to actually occur before finding standing 
could create “more latitude” for defendants to argue traceability.235 
As applied, the Seventh Circuit found a concrete injury in both the time 
required to resolve fraudulent transactions and the possibility of new-account 
fraud in the future.236  The Seventh Circuit also recognized that “fraudulent 
use . . . may continue for years.”237  And emphasized that 9,200 accounts have 
already been stolen and experienced fraudulent charges.238  Furthermore, the 
Seventh Circuit held that it was a reasonable inference that the hackers 
intended to commit credit-card and identity fraud.239 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
The Supreme Court emphasizes that an “actual” or “imminent” injury is 
the constitutional minimum to satisfy Article III’s “case” or “controversy” 
requirement.240  But even if the Constitution, in theory, mandates 
                                                
234 Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013)). 
235 Id. (quoting In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215, n.5 (N.D. Cal. 
2014)).  Many courts use the time element to show why a data-breach victim does not have any 
substantial risk of harm.  See, e.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 108 
F. Supp. 3d 949, 958 (D. Nev. 2015) (“Even if Plaintiffs’ [HRIT] was substantial and 
immediate in 2012, the passage of time without a single report from Plaintiffs that they in fact 
suffered the harm they fear must mean something.”).  
236 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 692–93, 696. 
237 Id. at 694 (quoting U.S. GOVT’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, REPORT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS:  PERSONAL INFORMATION 29 (2007)). 
238 Id. at 692. 
239 See id. at 693 (“Why else would hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’ 
private information?”) 
240 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (recognizing a 
“constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction” to “cases” or “controversies”) (quoting 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006)); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 
493, n.2 (1974) (A plaintiff “must show actual or threatened injury” for constitutional 
standing); R.S. v. D., 410 U.S. 614, 616–17 (1973) (noting that “federal plaintiffs must allege 
some threatened or actual injury” for standing). 
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a sufficient injury, it is silent on how imminent the injury must be.241  
Consequently, the Court has varied the threshold requirement when it 
contemplates the separation-of-powers doctrine and the severity of the 
potential.242  More specifically, the Court has relaxed the standing threshold 
the more severe the injury and has heightened its standing requirements the 
more the separation-of-power concerns are present.  The “certainly 
impending” threshold used in Clapper reflected both the Court’s perspective 
that there were heightened separation-of-powers concerns in the Court 
interfering with national security and intelligence-related matters, and the 
Court’s possible perspective Plaintiffs’ did not face severe consequences 
flowing from government surveillance.  Within this context, data-breach case 
victims raise little separation-of-powers concerns because it does neither 
affects, nor questions the constitutionality of, government activity.  
Furthermore, data-breach victims face a range of potential consequences, 
ranging from life-threatening discrepancies in their medical records to 
spending notable hours fixing fraudulent transactions. 
Yet, many courts have applied the rigorous “certainly impending” 
standard to almost all post-Clapper cases of heightened risk, defending this 
practice as applying the constitutionally minimum threshold.243  In doing so, 
those courts forget the primary purpose of standing law: the reluctance, of the 
courts, to decide whether the actions of the coordinate branches are 
constitutional without some certainty that a private injury would occur.244  
Thus, the courts should not apply such rigorous thresholds in HRIT cases.  
Instead, the courts should recognize the Supreme Court’s willingness, both 
                                                
241 Cf. Probabilistic Standing, supra note 62, at 66–70 (arguing that Article III does not require the 
court to base standing on the probability that the harm will occur). 
242 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559, 560 (1992) (noting that although 
standing is “essential” to Article III, some of the elements are “merely prudential”); Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (noting that the justiciability doctrine “has become a blend of 
constitutional requirements and policy considerations” and that the two are not “always clearly 
distinguished” (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)). 
243 See supra Part I.D. 
244 See supra Part I.B.1. 
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pre- and post-Clapper, to consider probabilistic injuries under a “substantial 
risk” or “reasonably likely” threshold.  And as part of a “substantial risk” 
analysis, courts should consider several risk factors within data breach cases 
that raise or lessen the chances that victims will face identity theft in the near 
future. 
 
A. The Standing Threshold is Context-Specific; “Substantial Risk” is Used When the 
Separation of Powers Concerns is Low or the Severity of the Injury is High 
 
Although the Supreme Court has expanded and restricted standing law 
over time, it has also applied standing law differently to different contexts.245  
First, the Court has emphasized that imminent harms must be “certainly 
impending,” a stringent standard that has been applied to prevent the Court 
from interfering with the other political branches.  Second, the Court has 
indicated some willingness to relax standing rules when the imminent harm is 
severe.  Applying these two factors, the Court demands that an injury be 
“certainly impending” when there are heightened separation-of-powers 
concerns and the anticipated harm is not substantial.  However, the Court 
should only require a plaintiff have a reasonable or “substantial” risk of injury 
when there are little separation-of-powers concerns and the anticipation harm 
is catastrophic.  Data-breach lawsuits generally have little separation-of-
powers concerns, but, depending on the circumstances, the consequences can 
range from financial to life-threatening issues. 
 
 
                                                
245 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORN. L. REV. 275, 275–
90 (2008) [hereinafter Standing and Private Rights] (discussing the history of the Court’s approach 
to standing law). 
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1. Separation-of-powers concerns abate when government activity is not 
involved 
 
Modern and historical standing law reflects the Courts’ reluctance to 
usurp the political branches by entertaining constitutional challenges to 
government actions without some certainty of a particularized injury.246  But 
whether a case has heightened separation-of-powers concerns should turn on 
the type of issue, not on the likelihood of injury.247  Otherwise stated, if 
standing law preserves the separation-of-powers, the imminence threshold 
would rise when a wide range of government activities are implicated.248  But 
likewise, the imminence threshold should be relaxed where a case does not 
require a court to decide on the constitutionality of government activities.  
For instance, most data-breach victims sue on common-law tort claims, e.g. 
negligence or breach of contract, where the courts need not opine on a 
statutes’ constitutionality.  Conversely, the Clapper Court had to decide on the 
constitutionality of government surveillance within a national security 
framework.  Even if, hypothetically, the likelihood of injury was similar in 
both cases, the data-breach cases would not have the same separation-of-
powers concerns.  
Taken to the extreme, the constitutional minimum for standing should be 
minimal when the courts are not required to decide on the constitutionality of 
legislation, regulation, or government action because there are no separation-
                                                
246 See, e.g., Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2695 (2015) 
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (arguing that standing doctrine is “built on a single basic idea – the idea of 
separation of powers”); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (noting 
that constitutional standing is “built on separation-of-powers principles”); Laird v. Tatum, 408 
U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (noting that it is Congress’ responsibility, not the courts,’ to rule on the 
“soundness of Executive action”); see also Probabilistic Standing, supra note 62, at 68–80 
(discussing the historical basis for requiring imminent or threatened injuries to be at least 
“probable”) 
247 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99–101 (1968). 
248 See supra note 246 and accompanying text; cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
564, n.2 (1992) (noting that the “certainly impending” threshold reduces the likelihood a Court 
would opine a case without injury).  But see Flast, 392 U.S at 101 (emphasizing that it is 
“substantive issues . . . to [be] adjudicated” that creates the separation-of-powers concerns).  
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of-powers concerns.249  The D.C. Circuit noted its concerns about “increased-
risk” cases because “[m]uch government regulation slightly increases [the] risk of 
injury,” and courts must, therefore, limit cases to those involving actual or 
imminent harm.250  But if the D.C. Circuit is the correct, then the injury 
requirement, and arguably much of constitutional standing, rests on whether 
government action is being challenged.  Anything more rests on more policy 
and prudential concerns, which are flexible.251     
Within this framework, Clapper, at most, re-emphasized existing 
requirements for plaintiffs who challenge government action on constitutional grounds, 
objecting to these cases where lower courts apply an “objectively reasonable 
likelihood” standard.252  Furthermore, a review of almost every subsequent 
Supreme Court case (after Pennsylvania) explicitly referencing the “certainly 
impending” standard involved a challenge to statute, regulation, or 
government action on constitutional grounds.253  Also, Clapper emphasized 
                                                
249 See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 110 (1969) (holding that “constitutional question[s]” 
about congressional acts require a live controversy); Flast, 392 U.S. at 107 (Douglas, J. 
concurring) (“The case or controversy requirement comes into play only when the Federal 
Government does something . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 100–02 (per 
curium) (holding that the minimum requirement of Article III standing is that the plaintiff has 
“a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 204) 
and that “the dispute touches upon ‘the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests’” 
(quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 at 240–41)); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 
447, 488 (1923) (holding that “acts of Congress” are only reviewable on constitutional grounds 
when the party can show actual or threatened injury). 
250 Pub Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety, Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (emphasis added). 
251 See Probabilistic Standing, supra note 62, at 91–92 (arguing that prudential rules help to advance 
many of the courts objectives, such as reducing “potential plaintiff” and ensuring that the issue 
is sharply presented for good resolution). 
252 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146–49 (noting heightened scrutiny when passing on the 
constitutionality of government activities is inconsistent with the “objectively reasonable 
likelihood” test); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972) (“[T]o invoke the judicial power to 
determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he . . . is immediately in 
danger of sustaining a direct injury) (emphasis added); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 
F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015) (cautioning courts not to “overread Clapper”). 
253 See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2338 (2014) (challenging Ohio 
statute on First Amendment grounds); Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1142 (challenging the 
constitutionality of government surveillance); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 
337–38 (2006) (declining to grant taxpayer standing when they challenged Ohio law providing 
tax credits); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224–26 (2003) (challenging an amendment to the 
1934 Federal Communications Act) (overruled on other grounds); Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 151 
(challenging constitutionality of a death penalty where defendant waives appeal); Pac. Gas and 
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that the standing threshold is “especially rigorous” when the court must 
decide on the constitutionality of federal government actions.254  But when 
threatened injuries are premised on a private party’s negligence, breach-of-
contract, or other common law theory, not implicating any statute or 
government action, these concerns arguably abate.   
Regardless, some imminent injury is required to satisfy Article III’s case-
or-controversy requirement,255  but the courts should apply a lower threshold, 
e.g. “substantial” or “reasonable risk,” when the government’s role is de 
minimis.  The threshold should vary with how much court’s opinion impacts 
coordinate branches.  This is directly related to the “certainly impending” 
threshold, which is intended to minimize the chances that the Court pass 
judgments where the injury is not immediate .256  To this extent, consider a 
scenario where a private party alleges a federal statute is unconstitutional, 
either as-applied or on its face, because the statute will injure the party 
                                                
Electr. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 198 (1983) 
(challenging California nuclear laws as preempted by federal regulation); see also Babbitt v. 
United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 292–94 (1979) (challenging the 
constitutionality of an Arizona employment law); Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 
U.S. 102, 121–22 (1974) (challenging the Rail Act).  But there are three notable environmental 
cases that are exceptions, including Lujan, where the plaintiffs (in those cases) challenged 
regulatory interpretations and administrative decisions; yet, the court used slightly different 
standards in some of these cases.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504–05 (2007) 
(challenging EPA’s non-regulation of greenhouse gases); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 557–59 (1992) (challenging Fish and Wildlife Service’s interpretation of the 1973 
Endangered Species Act); Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs.’ (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 173–74 (2000) (discussing a citizen-suit under the Clean Water Act). 
254 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (“[O]ur standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when 
reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of 
the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional”) (quoting Raines v. 
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997)); Blum v. Holder, 744 F.3d 790, 795–99 (1st Cir. 2014) 
(arguing that Clapper makes the standing requirement more rigorous when the courts must 
decide whether actions that are taken by the other branches of federal government are 
constitutional). 
255 See R.S. v. D., 410 U.S. 616, 616–17, n.4 (1991) (noting a longstanding and consistent 
requirement that  “federal plaintiffs must allege some threatened or injury”).  But see, e.g., 
Standing and Private Rights, supra note 245, at 279–90 (arguing there is no constitutional basis for 
an injury-in-fact requirement and that the injury requirement was first “developed . . .  to 
expand standing”). 
256 In theory, the more time that passes, the less of certainty that injury could occur.  See Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992) (describing imminence as the 
cornerstone of certainty). 
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between twenty-and-thirty years from now.257  If the private party now sues, 
the court would need to decide the constitutionality of a statute or 
government action for a harm twenty years from now, which reflects the 
federal court’s concern for separation of powers.258  In contrast, consider a 
private party that sues because she is likely to sustain an injury, because of the 
actions (or inactions) of another party at some point, or continuously, over 
the next twenty years.  In this case, there are far less concerns over the 
separation-of-powers doctrine because the court is merely resolving the legal 
rights of the parties without a high risk of making constitutional declarations.   
 
2. The Court varies the threshold when considering an injury’s severity 
 
The Court has also varied the standing threshold based on the severity 
and types of injuries, effectively making the inquiry context based.259  And the 
Court has never explicitly said that the Clapper standing threshold overruled 
any of the previous cases.260  For example, the Court has allowed standing 
when a plaintiff is at “substantial risk” of coming under the threat of criminal 
penalties.261  The Court has also related the severity of harm to the threshold 
                                                
257 See, e.g.,  Addington v. U.S. Airline Pilots Ass’n, 606 F.3d 1174, 1185 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bybee, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that ripeness or an imminent injury “‘coincides squarely with standing’s 
injury’ [requirement] [and is] ‘standing on a timeline’” (quoting Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 
F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009)).  Bybee’s dissent argued that ripeness turns on whether there 
remain any “contingent future events” in the plaintiffs’ theory of injury; and if there are no 
further contingencies, and the plaintiff would suffer hardship if judicial review was denied, then 
standing should be granted.  Addington, 606 F.3d at 1187–88.  Thus, in Bybee’s conclusion, 
“certainly impending” is about the absence of contingencies, rather than the proximity in time.  
Id.  This is similar to the “if” test. See infra notes 281–289 and accompanying text. 
258 Although there was no constitutional challenge to the Clean Air Act in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
Judge Roberts’ dissent addressed these particular facts for a possible injury “by the year 2100.” 
549 U.S. 497, 542 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
259 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100–02 (1968) (“[I]n ruling on standing, it is both 
appropriate and necessary to look to the substantive issues”). 
260 In fact, the Court still cites previous cases where they applied such exceptions.  See Clapper 
v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (citing Monsanto and Babbitt as good law). 
261 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014); see also supra notes 183–
186 and accompanying text. 
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inquiry, allowing for a relaxed likelihood when determining whether an injury 
is sufficiently imminent.262 
Both Babbit and Driehaus were examples where the Court found standing, 
even though the threat of harm was not certain or immediate.263  Both cases 
involved a plaintiff who faced a risk of criminal prosecution if they continued 
their allegedly protected activities.264  In finding standing for both plaintiffs, 
the Court did not require that such harm be immediate, only that there was a 
reasonable likelihood of enforcement in the future.265  The Court in Driehaus 
especially pointed to the risk of criminal prosecution as a basis for providing 
standing.266  The Court in Babbitt came to similar conclusions.267   
Similarly, the Court has implied that the likelihood inquires varies with 
the severity of the injury in Massachusetts v. EPA and Monsanto.  For instance, 
the Court in Massachusetts v EPA pointed to the “catastrophic” nature of rising 
sea levels to justify standing even when the likelihood was “remote.”268  
Likewise, the Court in Monsanto noted the “substantial risk” of 
“contamination” of “non-genetically-engineered alfalfa,” but did not mandate 
that such harms be essentially immediate, a cornerstone of “certainly 
impending.”269  In doing so, the Court pointed to “significant environmental 
                                                
262 See supra notes 193–195, 215 and accompanying text.  Most established risk-management 
practices mandate that a potential threat be analyzed from both their severity and probability of 
occurrence.  Specifically, the risk is a function of both likelihood and severity.  See, e.g., DEP’T 
OF THE ARMY, TECHNIQUES PUB. ATP 5-19, RISK MANAGEMENT 1–7, Table 1.1 (2014) (noting 
that “catastrophic” harms that “seldom” occur are considered to be “high risk”). 
263 See Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2345 (noting that the “threat of future enforcement . . . is 
substantial”); supra notes 213–215 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra notes 183–186, 209–217 and accompanying text. 
265 See Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2345–46 (noting the “substantial risk” of enforcement but falling 
short of noting that the risk is immediate); Babbit v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 
U.S. 289, 300, n.12 (1979) (“Challengers to election procedures often have been left without a 
remedy in regard to the most immediate election because the election is too far underway”). 
266 See Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2346 (“The burdensome Commission proceedings here are backed 
by the additional threat of criminal prosecution.”). 
267 See Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302 (holding that although the criminal provision “may never be 
applied,” the Plaintiffs do not need to wait for prosecution to bring their challenge). 
268 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007). 
269 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153–56 (2010) (noting the various 
ways farmers would have to react to the possibility of contamination). 
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concern[s]” emanating from cross-contamination.270  Also, the Court agreed 
that the Plaintiffs suffered an injury by expending cost to avoid the 
prospective risk of harm, even when they had not yet done so.271   
This type of harm was also Reilly’s basis for distinguishing between 
identity theft cases with toxic-exposure and defective-medical devices cases.272  
However, as discussed previously, many identity-theft victims face more than 
just financial losses, they can potentially face life-threatening or harmful issues 
when their medical records made inaccurate.273  Depending on the type and 
amount of PII stolen, a data-breach victim faces a wide range of potential 
injuries, many being health-related. 
These cases not only demonstrate the Court’s willingness to make 
exceptions on the rigorous “certainly impending” standard, but the Court, in 
doing so, illustrates that the constitutional floor for imminent injuries is 
something less than “certainly impending.”   
 
B. The “Substantial Risk” Threshold Should Emphasize the Victim’s Relative Risk in 
Heightened-Risk Injuries 
 
The Clapper and Driehaus Courts have never described in detail how likely a 
harm must be to meet the “substantial risk” threshold.  As discussed above, 
this is likely because the threshold is sensitive to separation-of-powers 
concerns and the severity of harm, which are context-specific.  But some 
circuit and district courts have quantified the “substantial risk” threshold in 
various degrees.  However, many such tests do little to account for the 
relative risk a victim faces.  Specifically, the tests largely ignore the degree the 
                                                
270 Id. at 155–56.  
271 See id. at 153–54 (noting that measures farmers would have to take if the injunctions were 
lifted, but finding that such measures were injuries). 
272 See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[S]tanding in medical-device 
and toxic-tort cases hinges on human health concerns); see also supra note 99 and accompanying 
text. 
273 See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text. 
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victims’ risk-profile changes by the defendant’s actions.  They should not.  
The “certainly impending” threshold covers the immediacy aspect, ignoring 
relative risk.  To have any merit as a distinguishable test, the “substantial risk” 
threshold must.   
 
1. The “certainly impending” threshold asks whether an injury will 
immediately occur, and not whether an injury will occur 
 
Any imminent-injury theory should not require the injury to have already 
occurred or is because, otherwise, half of the “actual or imminent” 
requirement in Lujan would be meaningless.274  It would also contradict 
Clapper’s acknowledgement of a substantial risk threshold.275  For instance, 
consider a breach victim alleging a HRIT, with identity theft being the 
ultimate injury; if the court forecloses any “possibility of future injury” and 
that must be certain to occur, then the probability is, essentially, one.  And 
given that that the identity theft would be more properly characterized as an 
actual injury.276  But many possibilities can become certainties over sufficient 
time:  “On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone will drop to 
zero.”277  Hypothetically, if an event, A, has a one-percent chance of 
occurring year-over-year, then, over a long enough period of time, the 
probability it will happen is one.278  Similarly, if the same event A has a 
                                                
274 See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (“Allegations of possible future injury 
do not satisfy . . . Art[icle] III.  A threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending.’”). Many 
courts use Whitmore’s language to compel dismissal of HRIT claims.  See, e.g., In re Sci. 
Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 19, 24 
(D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing most claims within the class for lack of ongoing identity theft).  But, 
again, Whitmore used the “certainly impending” standard in deciding a case involving 
government activity.  Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 151, 158.   
275 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150, n.5 (2013) 
276 See In re SAIC, 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 28 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that HRIT was not an injury 
under neither the certainly impending nor substantial risk threshold). The Court sought to root 
out class members that did not have a previous or ongoing identity theft attempt, but found 
actual injuries for members with previous identity theft attempts. Id. at 31–32. 
277 CHUCK PALAHNIUK, FIGHT CLUB 17 (1996).  
278 As proof: if event, A, has a 0.01 (or one percent) chance of occurring each year, then the 
chance that it does not occur in any particular year is 0.99 (or ninety-nine percent).  Let n be 
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heightened risk of a nineteen percent chance of occurring in a year, then the 
likelihood (assuming the year-over-year risk is the same) that A would occur 
within eight years is eighty percent.279  Consequently, any imminent injury 
theory cannot rest its threshold on a simple probability of occurrence; there 
should also be a time consideration.280   
“Certainly impending” incorporates the time consideration discussed 
above and requires that an injury not only have a near certainty of occurring, 
but that the certainty occurs immediately.281  In other words, it is not a 
question of whether; it is a question of when.  And this often expressed by 
the “if test” in Reilly and Clapper:  if a threatened or imminent injury cannot be 
described without using the word “if,” or a series of “ifs,” then the injury is 
speculative and too attenuated for Article III standing.282  Thus, the harm 
must be essentially “certain” because a party cannot have any conditional 
statements attached to the alleged injury.283  In other words, if a plaintiff 
requires that a conditional statement be satisfied to show injury, then the 
condition becomes an “if” within the “certainly impending” threshold.284 
                                                
the number of years; as n approaches infinity, the probability (P) that A would not occur is 
characterized by P(~A) = 𝑙𝑖𝑚$→& 0.99 $ = 0.  In other words, P(A) = 1. 
279 As proof: let P(A) = .19 for any year, then P(~A) = 1-P(A) = 1-0.19 = 0.81 for any year.  
Let n be the number of years required for P(A) to approach eighty percent, i.e. where 1 −𝑃(~𝐴)$ > 0.80.  n > 234(5.6)234(5.78) = 7.64 years. 
280 Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992) (noting that “certainly 
impending” requires a “high degree of immediacy”). 
281 Id.  
282 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1157–58 (2013) (demonstrating the 
series of “ifs”). Though Reilly cites Storino as a basis for the “if test,” the reasoning likely 
formulated from a reading of Whitmore, as it characterized the plaintiffs’ pleading in O’Shea as a 
series of if statements.  See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157–58 (1990) (“[I]f 
respondents proceed to violate an unchallenged law and if they are charged . . . they will be 
subjected to discriminatory practices” (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974))); 
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 43 (3d. Cir. 2011) (holding injuries speculative when “one 
cannot describe how the [plaintiffs] will be injured without beginning the explanation with the 
word ‘if.’” (quoting Storino v. Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 297–98 (3d Cir. 2003))).    
283 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (rejecting the premise that the 
Constitution requires imminent injuries to be “absolutely certain.”). 
284 The D.C. Circuit has an alternative way of expressing the “certainty” within “certainly 
impending” by holding “future predictions” that “are not normally susceptible of labeling as 
‘true’ or ‘false’” as speculative.  See United Transp. Union v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 
891 F.2d 908, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that the court “reject[s] as overly speculative those 
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But even if the Court were to follow its own threshold for imminent 
injuries, then the outcome of subsequent cases to Clapper would be different.  
For instance, in Driehaus, SBAL could not claim the harm was “certainly 
impending” because there is no way it could construe the harm without using 
the word “if.”  Regardless of how  SBAL constructs its theory of injury, it 
must condition it on a candidate (or other party) filing a complaint sometime in 
the future and on the commission panel finding probable cause; those 
conditions transform to “ifs” for the purposes of “certainly impending.”285  
Consequently, the Court confers standing in Driehaus case on something less 
than “certainly impending.”   
Nevertheless, this construction makes sense as a heightened standard if 
the Court is concerned about separation-of-powers because it limits the Court 
from passing constitutional questions without an immediate injury. 
 
2. Substantial risk tests should emphasize relative-risk injuries 
 
If “certainly impending” occupies the immediate time dimension,286 then 
substantial risk theory must turn on some other factor to have any meaning; 
and shown previously, it cannot simply be the probability of occurrence.287  
One possibility is that the substantial-risk test examines a conditions’ strength 
or reasonableness, rather than its existence.  For example, the Court in Driehaus 
could determine whether the condition “if a candidate files a complaint” is 
                                                
links which are predictions of future events”).  Under the above framework, a condition is 
speculative if there is uncertainty – not “true” or false” – in whether it will occur.  It then 
follows that the “certainly impending” threshold requires an injury to be essentially certain to 
happen. 
285 Id. 
286 See supra note 181. 
287 There seems to be a difference.  Compare Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148 (essentially requiring that 
the Plaintiffs produce evidence of monitoring before granting standing) with Monsanto v. 
Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754–55 (2010) (requiring a showing that deregulation 
creates a substantial risk for cross-contamination). 
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substantially or reasonably likely to occur, all factors considered.288  Similarly, 
the Massachusetts v. EPA Court examined whether global warming would be 
substantially worsened if the EPA didn’t regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
from new vehicles.289  This would be the essence of heightened risk analysis – 
deciding whether an event or condition occurring in the future is likely to 
occur.  But, even so, this runs into the same problems on an expanded 
timeline because the condition having a sustained, nonzero likelihood will 
certainly happen at some point in the distant future.290  Yet, if the Court binds 
substantial-risk theory with an immediacy requirement, there is little 
difference to the “certainly impending” threshold.  Consequently, the next 
logical step would be to examine a condition’s strength or likelihood over a 
‘reasonable’ period of time, ‘reasonable’ being more relaxed than 
immediate.291  But admittedly, this would raise an additional complexity of 
defining a “reasonable time period.”   
On the other hand, if the substantial-risk theory examines plaintiffs’ harm 
using a time as the indicator, then a distinguishable test emerges.  As a 
concrete example, consider a victim whose baseline risk of experiencing an 
event, E, to be one percent year-over-year.  Next, consider that a defendant’s 
action causes a sustained ten-fold increase (ten percent year-over-year) to the 
victim’s baseline risk of experiencing E.  Under the heightened risk, the 
victim has nearly an eighty percent chance she will experience E within fifteen 
                                                
288 See supra notes 200–208 and accompanying text.  The Court held that it standing did not 
turn on whether Driehaus would seek reelection because SBAL would discuss other candidates’ 
seeking reelection sometime in the future.  Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 
2344–45 (2014). 
289 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522–24 (2007) (discussing the effects of global 
warming). 
290 See supra notes 276–279 and accompanying text. 
291 For example, if an event A having a heightened risk of thirty percent per year, it might fail 
the certainly impending threshold because it is unlikely to be imminent; on the other hand, 
there is more than a seventy-five percent chance A could occur within the next four years, 
which may be acceptable under substantial risk.  Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 
(2007) (granting standing because global warming will have “catastrophic” effects at an 
unspecified point in the future); Driehaus, 135 S. Ct. at 2343–45 (granting standing because 
SBAL may be charged under the Ohio statute in some future election). 
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years; however, under her baseline risk, she would not reach an eighty percent 
chance of experiencing E until more than 160 years from now.292  In contrast, 
a victim with a ten-percent baseline risk of experiencing E, but an eleven-
percent heightened risk of E, would only experience a year-and-a-half’s 
difference before hitting an eighty percent threshold.  Thus, under this 
approach, both the underlying risk and the relative increase in risk are 
considered over time, but the relative risk impacts are better accounted for. 
Also, cases where the harm is conditional on an independent third-party 
actor are doomed under the “certainly impending” standard on traceability 
grounds.293  However, the “substantial” or “reasonable” risk standard would 
allow standing if the strength of the assumption on the third-party actor is 
substantial.294   That is, if it is reasonable to assume that a third-party actor, 
either through probability or stated intent, then there should be a sufficient 
basis for injury-in-fact, especially if the emphasis is on the relative risk.  Also, 
many security experts argue that finding out where the stolen data came from 
is fairly easy for investigators.295 
 
 
 
                                                
292 N, number of years, is given by N >  234(5.75)234(89:(;)) , where P(E) is either 0.99 for baseline risk 
or 0.90 for heightened risk. 
293 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that the injury cannot 
result from third-party actions).   
294 A good example is the Court’s reasoning in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).  In Bennett, 
the Court noted that if there are “determinative or coercive” effects on the third-party, then it 
can be fairly traceable.  Id. at 168–69.  But this reasoning presupposes that the third-party actor 
will act in accordance with the coercive effect, essentially making the analysis probabilistic.  See 
id. at 169 (“[W]hile Service’s Biological O[pinion theoretically serves an ‘advisory function,’ . . . 
in reality it has a powerful coercive effect on the action agency.”). 
295 See Krebs on Healthcare, supra note 33 (noting that value is not as easily derived from 
healthcare records since they are largely handled by third parties who don’t have a direct 
connection to the patients). 
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3. Current substantial-risk tests that emphasize overall risk do not do 
enough to account for relative risk 
 
The D.C. Circuit has proposed two ways to determine whether an 
imminent injury exists:  the first way is to treat the “ultimate alleged harm . . . 
as the concrete and particularized injury and then … determine whether the 
increased risk of such harm [is] sufficiently ‘imminent;’”296 the second is to 
treat the heightened risk as an actual injury.297  The second approach is 
arguably cleaner because it keeps the courts from having to make difficult, 
and sometimes subjective, determinations about which injuries are sufficiently 
imminent;298 however, the D.C. Circuit has argued that such an approach also 
renders the “actual or imminent” meaningless and opts for the first 
approach.299 
Given the first approach, several courts have advanced a substantial risk 
test.  Galaria’s theory that the heightened risk, alone has no significant bearing 
on the likelihood of an injury-in-fact and that the proper question is whether 
the plaintiff has an overall “substantial risk” of injury.300  The D.C. Circuit 
solidifies this reasoning further by requiring that an alleged injury result in “(i) 
a substantially increased risk of harm and (ii) a substantial probability of harm 
with that increase taken into account.”301  In other words, not only does the 
victim have to show that a defendant’s actions have caused a measurable 
                                                
296 See Public Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1297–98 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting the approach to characterize heightened risk as an injury and, 
instead, presenting an approach using probability-of-harm as the measure). 
297 See id. (arguing that if heightened risks were actual injuries, then the imminence requirement 
would be meaningless); see also In re SAIC, 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 26 (D.D.C. 2014) (declining to 
characterize heightened risk as an actual injury). 
298 See Probabilistic Standing, supra note 62, at 75–77 (noting that courts would not need to rely on 
“precise calculations of probabilities” if all imminent injuries had standing); see also Winters, 
supra note 67, at 365 (arguing the “quantify[ing] risk” mixes “threshold determination[s]” with 
“merits analysis”). 
299 See Public Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1297–98 (holding that treating heightened risk as an injury 
would lead to standing in every case). 
300  See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2014) 
(distinguishing between relative risk of injury and absolute risk). 
301 Public Citizen v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety, 489 F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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increase in the risk of injury, but also that measurable increase has now placed 
the victim at substantial risk of injury.   
But both tests fail to account for relative risk, especially across time, 
which is arguably what the whole issue is.302  As an example, consider a victim 
whose baseline risk of developing a particular type of cancer is fifty out of 
every 100,000 (0.05 percent), but because of defendant’s actions, his risk is 
twenty-five fold (1.25 percent).  In terms of time to reach an eighty-percent 
risk threshold, the victim moves from 3,218 years to 128 years!  The relative 
risk is twenty-five times greater, but the overall risk is still less than two 
percent, and would likely lead to a rejection of standing by the D.C. Circuit.  
Yet, it is unlikely that few societies today would conclude that the victim was 
not injured in some way, especially when the result is spread over a class or a 
group.303  As a result, the “substantial risk” threshold should rely more heavily 
on the relative risk, the first prong of the D.C. Circuit’s test, rather than the 
second prong. 
 
III. APPLYING THE CONTEXT-SPECIFIC THRESHOLD FOR IMMINENT 
INJURIES TO DATA-BREACH CASES 
 
In Part II, this Article proposes a framework for a context-specific 
standing threshold that varies its likelihood requirement based on separation-
of-powers concerns and the severity of harm.  It also proposes that the 
                                                
302  For instance, consider P, whose ordinary chances of suffering an injury are one percent, but 
because of D’s actions, P’s chances of injury increase by one percent year over year.  Under the 
rigorous D.C. test, P would not have standing until one day, perhaps fifty years from now, 
which at that point the injury is more likely than not to occur.  A concrete example would be 
fingerprint data exposure.  See David Alexander, 5.6 Million Fingerprints Stolen in U.S. Personnel 
Data Hack: Government, REUTERS (Sep. 23, 2015 3:50pm), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-cybersecurity-fingerprints-idUSKCN0RN1V820150923 (noting OPM’s acknowledgement 
that although the technology to exploit fingerprint data is “currently limited,” “the threat could 
increase over time”). 
303 See Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion?  The Dangers of Imposing a Standing Threshold, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 391, 411–15 (2009) (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s substantial risk test and arguing that it 
fails to account for the population size and an injury’s magnitude). 
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relaxed “substantial risk” threshold focuses on the increase in relative risk that 
the victim suffers from the defendant actions.  Given that a data-breach 
victim usually sues on a theory of negligence, fraud, breach o 
contract, or unjust enrichment,304  separation-of-powers concerns are 
minimal, and the courts should be comfortable in applying a lower threshold 
of injury.305  Moreover, if the courts were to require apply the “substantial” or 
“reasonable” risk standard as a threshold, analyzing the victim’s relative-risk 
of harm, then a good balance is drawn between caseload and ensuring the 
victim’s get their day in court.306  After all, several companies have settled 
after the courts found standing in their respective cases.307 
 
A. Factors to Consider for Substantial Risk Analysis 
 
To determine whether a breach victim alleging a HRIT should have 
standing, the courts should begin with identity theft as the ultimate injury; 
next, the court should determine how the defendant’s actions have changed 
the victim’s risk profile compared to the victim’s baseline risk.308  If the 
relative-risk is substantial in that it changes the victim’s risk profile in a 
meaningful way, then the court should find standing.309  Most importantly, 
when “substantial risk” is applied, the courts should not fixate on whether the 
harm will occur within a fixed timeframe; instead, the courts should look at 
empirical data and other factors to inform its analysis.  
                                                
304 See supra Part I.D. 
305 See supra Part II.A.1. 
306 See supra Part II.B.3. 
307 See e.g. TARGET BREACH SETTLEMENT, https://targetbreachsettlement.com/ (last updated 
Dec.  2015) (notifying victims of a settlement and a chance to file a claim); Anne Bucher, Adobe 
to Settle Data Breach Class Action Lawsuit, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/54519-adobe-to-settle-data-
breach-class-action-lawsuit/ (noting that Adobe has a reached a proposed settlement with data-
breach victims). 
308 See supra Part II.B.3. 
309 Supra Part II.B.3. 
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Fortunately (or unfortunately), cybersecurity and protecting sensitive 
information (to include PII) have taken a front seat in national politics.310  
Consequently, there is increasing data on the effects of identity theft, trends 
on cyber intrusion, and on the risks victims often face in these situations.311  
Recent trends from Javelin Research suggest that “two-thirds of identity fraud 
victims” had previously received a data-breach notice “in the same year.”312  
Identity theft has been a sixteen-to-twenty-one billion dollar industry over the 
past five years, affecting more than ten million Americans annually.313  In 
2014, fourteen percent experienced out-of-pocket losses of $1,000 or more.314  
Sadly, many experts conclude that most data breaches were preventable, with 
one analysis noting the number to be as high as ninety percent.315   
 
1. Active or Recent Cases of Actual Identity Theft 
 
In analyzing data-breach cases, the courts should consider a combination 
of the following factors when determining whether there is a substantial or a 
reasonable risk of injury.  Generally, the courts do find standing when there 
have been previous or ongoing identity thefts.316  It is arguable that most 
                                                
310 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL 
CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/cybersecurity.pdf (discussing various 
initiatives for strengthening cybersecurity); DHS, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE 
CYBERSPACE 14–15 (2003), https://www.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf)(noting confidentiality as a 
priority). 
311 DBIR 2015, supra note 3, at 3; FINKLEA, supra note 230. 
312 Press Release, $16 Billion Stolen from 12.7 Million Identity Fraud Victims in 2014, JAVELIN 
STRATEGY & RESEARCH (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/press-release/16-
billion-stolen-127-million-identity-fraud-victims-2014-according-javelin-strategy. 
313 Tamara E. Holmes, Credit Card Fraud and ID Theft Statistics, CREDITCARDS.COM (Sep. 16, 
2015), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-security-id-theft-fraud-
statistics-1276.php. 
314 HARRELL, supra note 7, at 6. 
315 See SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENHANCING BEST PRACTICES, ONLINE TRUST ALLIANCE 1 
(2015), https://otalliance.org/system/files/files/resource/documents/ota2015-
bestpractices.pdf. 
316 See supra notes 172–173 and accompanying text; see also In re Target Corp. Customer Data 
Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1158–59 (D. Minn. 2014) (noting that many of the 
Plaintiffs “actually incurred unauthorized charges”). 
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cases involving some class members who experienced recent or ongoing 
identity theft attempts creates a substantial risk of identity theft for all 
members.317  But the inquiry should not end there.318  The whole point of 
imminent injury standing is that it allows for those injuries that have not yet 
occurred.319  Moreover, there are many instances where breach victim are 
injured in ways that are not apparently linked.320  Often, this occurs because 
companies retain significant amounts of historical, redundant, or excessive 
PII, and consumers are unaware that a breach may have affected them.321  
More importantly, the substantial risk standard demands more.322  Thus, the 
courts should consider additional factors that weigh upon a victim’s relative 
risk.     
 
 
 
                                                
317 This is not because the probability that any given victim experiencing identity theft directly 
influences the probability that any other victim would experience the same thing.  But it does 
demonstrate both technical competency and intent by the hackers or thieves to utilize the 
stolen data for financial crimes or other purposes.  See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 
38, 43–44 (3d Cir. 2011) (distinguishing the attack in Pisciotta). 
318 See, e.g, Peters v. St. Joseph Servs.’ Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 854–55 (S.D. Tex. 2015) 
(applying the “if” test and noting that Plaintiffs cannot have standing until their theory of 
injury actually happens); see also In re SAIC, 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25–28 (D.D.C. 2014) (allowing 
only one litigant to proceed because the other litigants had no actual injuries).  
319 See supra part II.B.2.  
320 For instance, when Anthem Blue Cross disclosed a massive breach, the company and 
government officials noted that there was no evidence of identity theft.  Rick Jurgens, A Year 
Later, Impact of Anthem Data Breach Still Debated, VALLEY NEWS (Feb. 24, 2016), 
http://www.vnews.com/Archives/2016/02/a1-anthembreach-rj-vn-022116.  But the victims 
allege that they have had “fake tax returns filed in their names,” along with fraudulent credit 
cards and loans in their names.  Id.  Victims in Storm had also faced fraudulent tax-return issues 
near the time of Paytime’s data breach.  See Barbara Miller, Paytime Data Breach Could Reach an 
Estimated 216,000 in U.S., PENN LIVE (last updated Jun. 8, 2014, 9:24AM), 
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2014/06/paytime_data_breach_reaches_an.ht
ml (noting that the victim had not used Paytime “since 2008” but believes that Paytime 
retained his old information).  But see Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 365–66 (M.D. 
Pa. 2015) (noting that none of the class members actually experienced any injury from data 
misuse).           
321 Nicholas Elliott, Cyber Compliance: Data Excess Magnifies Risk, RISK & COMPLIANCE, WALL ST. 
J. (May 14, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/05/14/cyber-
compliance-data-excess-magnifies-breach-risks/; see Miller, supra note 320. 
322 See supra part II.B. 
Vol. 7, No. 1                      A POST-CLAPPER WORLD 
 
 
 
175 
2. Other Factors 
 
Encryption secures data from being accessible by third-parties.323  There 
are several industry standards and readily available encryption software, 
making this important protection widely implement across multiple industries 
today.324  Disk and server encryption greatly lowers potential victims’ risks, 
particularly in physical-theft cases where a laptop or hard-disk is stolen.325  If 
a stolen laptop or hard-disk has encryption, the hacker must defeat the 
encryption to even access the information.  On the other hand, anyone could 
exploit the information where there is no encryption.326  Surprisingly, many 
corporations and agencies fail to follow this basic practice.327  Thus, the 
courts should consider whether the data is encrypted in its substantial risk 
calculus. 
Also, as some courts have hinted that the sophistication of an attack 
provides some insight as to the probability that victims of a data-breach will 
face a successful identity theft in the future.328  A sophisticated and targeted 
                                                
323 See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1206–07 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(noting that the hackers were able to decrypt the personal data in Adobe’s servers); see generally 
KAREN SCARFONE ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF SCI. & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL 
PUB. 800-111, GUIDE TO STORAGE ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGIES FOR END USER DEVICES 2-3, 
2-4 (2007), http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/nist800111.pdf [hereinafter NIST SP800-
111] (discussing encryption). 
324 See NIST SP800-111, supra note 323, at 3-1 (discussing various encryption options such as 
disk-based or system-based encryption))).) 
325 See Avoid Identity Theft: Protecting Social Security Numbers, U.S. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/phila/ProtectingSSNs.htm (recommending encryption to prevent theft 
of social-security numbers). 
326 See In re SAIC, 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that the personal information 
on the stolen laptop required specialized hardware and software). 
327 See, e.g., Robert Westervelt, Coca-Cola Laptop Breach A Common Failure of Encryption, Security 
Basics, CRN (Jan. 27, 2014, 4:55 PM), http://www.crn.com/news/security/240165711/coca-
cola-laptop-breach-a-common-failure-of-encryption-security-basics.htm; see also Eric Chabrow, 
Why Organizations Fail to Encrypt, BANK INFO SECURITY (Dec. 22, 2012), 
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/interviews/encryption-i-1740/op-1; Rick Robinson, The 
Impact of a Data Breach Can be Minimized Through Encryption, SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 21, 
2014), https://securityintelligence.com/the-impact-of-a-data-breach-can-be-minimized-
through-encryption/ (comparing Adobe’s data breach with Target’s data breach and how 
encryption would have minimized the cost). 
328 See Reilly,F.3d at 44 (recognizing that the attacker in Pisciotta was “sophisticated”); In re Adobe 
Sys., 66 F. Supp.3d at 1206–07  (describing a highly sophisticated attack where hackers spent 
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attack requires time, money, and skill, and there is a higher likelihood that 
with the investment of resources, the damage is greater.329  Furthermore, the 
more time that passes between the actual attack, the discovery of the attack by 
either the victim or the server operators, and the notification to all potential 
victims, the more likely that a successful identity theft is possible.330 
As previously discussed, attackers sometimes make announcements of a 
successful breach and will also state their intentions, sometimes in the form 
of a demand.331  The court need not speculate about an attacker’s intentions if 
an attacker includes threats of subsequent actions, such the use or disclosure 
personal information.  Thus, if there is a stated intent, then the courts should 
take such intentions as true and analyze whether the victims face a heightened 
risk based upon such intentions.  
Courts should also consider whether there is any clear evidence that data 
was actually stolen.  In 2015, there were nearly 80,000 data breach incidents; 
however, only a little more than 2,100 had confirmation that data was 
stolen.332  It is less likely that victims are at a risk of identity theft if there is no 
confirmed report that the exposed personal information was stolen. 
Finally, not all data is equal.  Some captured information can be used 
within a short period of time and only one time.  On the other hand, other 
                                                
weeks breaching Adobe’s servers).  Contra Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 365–68 
(M.D. Pa. 2015) (dismissing highly sophisticated attacks as indicative of risk and insisting on an 
actual injury prior to standing). 
329 See Graeme R. Newman, The Problem of Identity Theft, CENTER FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED 
POLICING (2004), (http://www.popcenter.org/problems/identity_theft/) (distinguishing 
between highly organized identity theft operations and opportunistic ones, finding that the 
more organized the scheme, the higher chance of success). 
330 See SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION - IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 8 (2003), 
http://www.popcenter.org/problems/identity_theft/PDFs/FTC_2003a.pdf (discussing the 
benefits of a “quick discovery” and noting that the amount of time and money a victim needs 
to resolve identity theft cases is correlated with the length of time between breach and 
discovery). 
331 See David Robb, Sony Hack: A Timeline, DEADLINE (Dec. 22, 2014, 1:25 PM), 
http://deadline.com/2014/12/sony-hack-timeline-any-pascal-the-interview-north-korea-
1201325501/ (noting that the hackers in Sony threatened to release personal information, 
emails, and other data if Sony did not comply with their demands).  The attack on Ashley 
Madison also resulted in a ransom letter.  Krebs, supra note 18. 
332 DBIR 2015, supra note 3, at 3. 
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information, such as SSNs, birthdates, and health information have lesser 
value when separate, but when aggregated, can create a complete profile of 
the victim for future exploitation.333  Such “permanent” PII creates longer-
term risk for a victim compared with shorter-term information, such as credit 
and debit card numbers.  Yet, some studies have shown that stolen credit card 
or debit card information is a clear indicator of substantial risk.334  
Consequently, the court should consider the amount and type of personal 
information that was potentially collected about a given individual or 
organization.  For instance, healthcare information was the most coveted data 
in 2015 because sizable profits could be obtained from insurance fraud.335  
Also hackers who obtain large quantities of PII on individuals have multiple 
opportunities to exploit that information.336 
The relationship between time and the type of information can help 
courts considerably.  For instance, if debit and credit card numbers were 
compromised, as in Zappos, and a few years pass without any substantial 
identity theft within the affected class, then there is likely no meaningful 
heightened risk.337  On the other hand, when a victim loses control of her 
health records, biographical data, and SSN, she may not realize the full effect 
of the injury until several years have passed. 
All of these factors play into a “substantial risk” analysis.  If courts apply 
these factors to standing law in data-breach cases, several cases would have 
                                                
333 See U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, PROTECTING AGGREGATED DATA 4–6 
(2005) (defining data aggregation and discussing the associated inherent risks). 
334 See Kathy Kristof, Fraud Risk Soaring for Data Breach Victims, CBS NEWS (Feb. 5, 2014, 2:27 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fraud-risk-soaring-for-data-breach-victims/ (noting a 
study that indicated that, in 2013, “[forty-six] percent of consumers with a breached debit card” 
were “fraud victims in the same year”). 
335 RECORD BREAKING HEALTHCARE DATA BREACHES IN 2015 MAY BE ECLIPSED IN 2016, 
HIPPA JOURNAL (Dec. 10, 2015) http://www.hipaajournal.com/healthcare-data-breaches-in-
2015-2016-worse-2012/.  
336 See, e.g., Peters v. St. Joseph Servs.’ Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 850–51 (S.D. Tex. 2015) 
(noting that victim’s “[SSN], birthdate, address, medical records and bank account 
information” was stolen and that the victim experienced everything from telemarketing for 
medical devices to attempted hacks on her Amazon account); 
337 See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 958 (D. Nev. 2015) (suggesting that three 
years without incident may not qualify as an imminent injury). 
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come out differently.  For instance, The Texas branch of St. Joseph Health 
Network’s data systems were attacked sometime in December 2013.338  The 
hackers had accessed patients’ SSNs, birthdates, medical records, and 
financial data.339 St. Joseph discovered the breach and notified potential 
victims; the victims sued St. Joseph, arguing they have a HRIT.340  However, 
the district court held that the victims lacked standing because a HRIT is not 
“certainly impending.”341  And Clapper does not allow mitigation expenses for 
‘hypothetical’ injuries.342  But the district court did not apply any meaningful 
“substantial risk” analysis.343  Under “substantial risk” the court would have 
considered that the substantial amount of permanent PII stolen, which 
created the potential for medical and identity fraud.  In doing so, the court 
would acknowledge the strong possibility that the victims may face serious 
injuries in the future stemming from the data breach.   
Moreover, the California branch of the St. Joseph Health System recently 
settled with data-breach victims in a separate case for twenty-eight million 
dollars.344  The settlement stemmed from a mishandled security configuration 
in January 2011 that allowed tech-savvy individuals to access a “patient[s’] 
names, diagnoses list, medication allergies, body mass index, blood pressure, 
                                                
338 David F. Carr, Texas Hospital Discloses Huge Breach, INFORMATION WEEK (Feb. 5, 2014, 2:00 
PM), http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/security-and-privacy/texas-hospital-
discloses-huge-breach-/d/d-id/1113724. 
339 Id. 
340 Peters, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 850–51. 
341 See id. at 854–55 (noting that Plaintiffs’ identity theft injury rests on a series of “ifs”). 
342 See id. at 855–56 (acknowledging Clapper’s holding that plaintiffs cannot create standing by 
“making an expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear”) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151 (2015)). 
343 Id. at 854–55.  Although the district court acknowledges “substantial risk,” it neither applies 
a distinct test nor explains why the Plaintiffs do not meet it.  See id. at 855 (“The allegation that 
risk has been increased does not transform that assertion in to a cognizable injury.”). 
344 Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, ‘Egregious’ Breach Results in Hefty Settlement, HEALTH INFO 
SECURITY (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.healthcareinfosecurity.com/egregious-breach-results-
in-hefty-settlement-a-8974. 
Vol. 7, No. 1                      A POST-CLAPPER WORLD 
 
 
 
179 
lab results, smoking status, and advanced directive status,” along with “birth 
date, race, and gender.”345   
 
B. Remijas Correctly Applies Standing Law and Substantial Risk Factors When 
Considering Data-Breach Risks 
  
In deciding whether the class of victims had standing to bring a lawsuit 
against Neiman Marcus under a common-law theory of negligence and other 
claims, the Remijas Court concludes that they did using the standards 
discussed in Part II.B.1.346  Moreover, the Court distinguished Clapper on its 
facts and relaxed the standing requirement to allow a heightened risk of injury 
under the substantial risk standard.  
The victims sued Neiman Marcus under “state breach laws” and other 
common tort claims; they did not allege the unconstitutionality of a statute or 
regulation, nor did they challenge government action.  Consequently, the 
Court considered their injury claims under a relaxed imminent injury 
threshold of “substantial” or “reasonable” risk.347 
In analyzing the risk, the Court considered three factors: (1) 9,200 of the 
350,000 “potentially exposed cards” were already “used fraudulently;” (2) 
malware was found in the system that resulted from a fairly sophisticated 
attack; (3) and the hack occurred around three to six months before the 
discovery.  The court also noted that the hack and subsequent downloading 
of consumer records created a fair presumption that the hackers intended to 
commit fraud.  And Neiman Marcus confirmed that data was actually stolen 
when it investigated the data breach.  Moreover, the type of information 
(debit and credit accounts) was the type of information that has value in the 
                                                
345 See Howard Anderson, Glitch Exposes Medical Record Online, HEALTHCARE INFO SECURITY 
(Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.healthcareinfosecurity.com/glitch-exposes-medical-records-
online-a-4515 (noting that the information was accessible via Internet for nearly a year). 
346 See Part I.E.4. and accompanying text.  
347 See Part I.E.4. and accompanying text. 
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immediacy, so some evidence of existing identity fraud was to be expected.  
The Remijas Court understood that there were little separation-of-powers 
concerns, as compared to Clapper.  And although the main issue in Remijas was 
credit-card fraud, the Court correctly applied a substantial risk test to arrive at 
standing.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Ms. Edith Ramirez, Federal Trade Commission Chairwoman, testified 
shortly after the Neiman Marcus breach that “companies continue to make 
very fundamental mistakes when it comes to security” and that she did not 
“believe the burden should be placed on consumers.”348  Currently the 
burden is.349  And the courts should not preclude data-breach victims who 
have a realistic and credible potential for identity and medical fraud.  The 
Remijas Court agreed.  And the Remijas acknowledged that Clapper did not 
foreclose all data-breach victims from suing corporations who mishandle their 
PII.350    
Cybersecurity is an emerging area that requires serious attention across all 
sectors of industry, government, and the greater society.  Cybersecurity is no 
less important than physical security, something that many corporations take 
seriously.  But sound practices are best developed and improved when the 
cost and risk allocations are distributed properly across all sectors.  They 
currently are not.  Data breach victims have little recourse and little power in 
compelling corporations and agencies to protect their PII, yet it is a priority 
(and a concern) for many. 
                                                
348 Grant Cross, Target and Neiman Marcus Execs Defend Security Practices, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 
5, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2487386/cybercrime-
hacking/target-and-neiman-marcus-execs-defend-security-practices.html. 
349 See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text. 
350 See supra Part I.E.4. 
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Standing law has been a major impediment to data-breach victims.351  But 
it does not have to be.  This Article argued that Clapper does not compel non-
justiciability in all heightened-risk cases; the separation-of-powers doctrine 
does not either.  And case-load concerns can be mitigated by applying a 
lower, but sensible, substantial-risk threshold that accounts for the relative-
risk increase of HRIT that many face.  The costs are not trivial; many victims 
spend months resolving outstanding financial and credit issues caused by 
identity theft.352  To make matters worse, less than three percent of these 
victims note that they were saved by credit-monitoring service.  Many have 
reported becoming distraught; a few have committed suicide. 
This Article presented a framework for imminent injuries that can help 
give victims the much-needed redress without flooding the courts with a tidal 
wave of data-breach litigation.  By using an imminent injury framework 
sensitive to separation-of-powers doctrine and severity of the injuries, the 
courts adhere to Article III principles without needlessly shutting the door for 
victims who have little recourse.  Additionally, a “substantial risk” threshold 
that focuses on relative risk can help in correcting the unbalanced cost-risk 
allocation that exists within these situations.  In doing so, corporations will 
invest more in cybersecurity and embrace current best practices, stemming 
the billions of dollars that society incurs yearly.  
  
                                                
351 See supra Part I.D. 
352 See supra notes 55–60. 
